Prepared by: General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Study
After the Armistice of Mondros, Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to İstanbul and stayed in Pera Palas Hotel for a while. And then he rented a house in Şişli. In this house, the plans for the War of Independence were made. One of the guests of the house was Colonel İsmet Bey.
One day, Mustafa Kemal Pasha invited İsmet Pasha and asked him about the news. He laid a map on the table asking a question to İsmet Bey: “Suppose that I do not have any authorization or status. In this case what would be the best area to pass to Anatolia and to try to find the solutions for the national cause and the best way to take me to that area?” The reason why Mustafa Kemal Pasha asked such a question was that Colonel İsmet was the person who could judge the conditions in which the country was and that he agnised the army fully and concerned himself with the national affairs. Colonel İsmet answered: “There exist many areas and many ways!”
Mustafa Kemal Pasha met with Colonel İsmet Bey before going to Anatolia as the 9th Army Inspector and said that he would be calling him to Anatolia to help himself in the struggle. He warned Colonel İsmet not to contact with him during his stay in İstanbul due to his post.
When Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrived in Ankara on the 27th of December in 1919, he summoned Colonel İsmet Bey. Colonel İsmet, without the permission of his superiors, went to Ankara on January 8th in 1920. But upon the call of the War Minister Fevzi Pasha, he returned to İstanbul on the 3rd of February in 1920 with the authorization of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The duty of Colonel İsmet was to conduct the necessary operation from İstanbul in order to prepare a disciplined and regular army.
This mission continued until the occupation of İstanbul on the 16th of March in 1920 by the Allied states. Deciding that there was nothing else that could be done in İstanbul after the occupation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha called Colonel İsmet to Ankara. Thus, on April 9th 1920, Colonel İsmet was in Ankara for the second time. Now he was going to take his place as the right-hand man of Mustafa Kemal Pasha until the end of the War of Independence. He became the deputy of Edirne in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) as well as the General Chief of Staff of the first government.
On November 10th in 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha assigned Colonel İsmet to the Chief of the Northern Region of the Western Front and Colonel Refet (Bele) to the Chief of Southern Front. He ordered the nationalist forces in both fronts to be turned into regular armies. The reason that Mustafa Kemal Pasha made such decision was that the attack against the Western Anatolia by the Greek forces could not be stopped.
Before the appointment of Colonel İsmet to the Chief of the Northern Region of the Western Front, the Greeks had already commenced the offensive operation to Bursa Front. The war with the Greeks arose from the invasion of İzmir (May 15, 1919). Allies acknowledged the lands in the south İzmir-Aydın railway, in southeast from Aydın to Nazilli, in the east and northeast Manisa and Turgutlu, in the north Ayvalık and Bergama as the Greek Occupation Zone. It was the Nationalist Forces which tried to stop the Greeks who were occupying these territories forwarding from İzmir towards the inland of Anatolia.
The resistance getting much harsher with the raising number of the Nationalist Forces, the Greeks and their supporters Allies states started worrying. As a result, on November the 3rd in 1919, the Commander of the Occupation Forces of the Allied states General Milne demarcated a line where no passage could be succeeded either by Turks or Greeks so as to stop the attack coming from the Turks and to prevent Greek forces from being harassed while strengthening their military forces.
While Nationalist Forces refused to accept forming such a line, the government in İstanbul accepted it. Greek forces also halted at this line due to the intervention of the Allies. Later, the Greeks crossed the line and moved forward to Ankara. The political aim of this attack was to force the Turkish nation to accept the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres that was being prepared at the time. And the military aim of the attack was to disperse the Grand National Assembly’s armies and to invade the Turkish lands stretching away to Ankara.
Military forces and national platoons whose armament and munition fell short attempted to stop the attack before the efforts made to establish a regular army had finished. But against the superior army forces, they had to withdraw. The enemy forces who occupied Balıkesir in June 30th, 1920 seized Bursa as well by following our forces that was retreating in the direction of Bursa. (16)
Within just two months, falling of the major cities into the enemy’s hands and the disorder on the national fronts led to a great concern and tension both in the assembly and the nation.
On July 13th, 1920, at the meeting of the deputies of National Assembly, it was put forward that this defeat was born due to poor commanding and failure of the commanders and governors and that the commander in chief and minister of defense were also responsible for that defeat and it was even proposed that the commanders who did not fulfill their duties were better to be sent to the Court-Martial.
It was not possible to appease the deputies though the Chief of Staff had already responded all the severe judgments made. Under these circumstances, Mustafa Kemal Pasha took the floor in order to explain the situation in which the country was and set fort the reasons why a regular army should be formed. In the assembly, however, two opposite ideas collided in terms of the type of the army that was to take an action. Both ideas of a regular army and militia forces were brought to the table. Nationalist forces commander Ethem was a defender of the idea to use the militia forces.
The propagandas were so poignant and influential amongst the Western Front, the army and the public and even the assembly that at one stage the following lines rallied supporters: “There is no benefit derived from the army, disperse it. We all shall be united as nationalist forces. ”
In the meantime, the Western Front commander Ali Fuat Pasha proposed with the influence of two brothers Ethem and Tevfik to assault an allegedly weak division of the Greek army situated in Gediz. Even though the General Staff warned that the entirety of the enemy forces were stronger than the Turkish troops, that it was absolutely necessary to wait due to the lack of munition and that a result that would be satisfactory could not be retrieved, two infantry divisions and troops of the nationalist forces attacked the enemy in Gediz. As a result, the raid was unsuccessful and in response to this, on October 25 the Greeks invaded İnegöl and Yenişehir as well.
After the failure of Gediz operation, Ethem and his brothers put the blame on the Front Command and the regular army troops while the Front Command claimed that the nationalist forces did not undertake any responsibility and have the sufficient power to accomplish anything. They also proved the fact that the nationalist forces did not follow the orders and that they kept themselves away from the danger. (17)
Thereupon, it was immediately decided to form a regular army while Ali Fuat Pasha was being suspended from his duty front commander and Western Front was divided into two parts as northern and southern fronts. (18) The northern front which constituted the prominent part of the whole front and where the Greek troops held forward operations was assigned to the command of Colonel İsmet. (19)
Collecting animals and supplies from the public as well as mobilizing soldiers, the new infantry and cavalry units were being founded. Nevertheless, these efforts did not correspond to the expectations. In the late 1920s land forces of Grand National Assembly of Turkey’s government were consisted of 17 divisions. And they were shy of crew, arms and equipment. Consequently, there was no room for comparison with the Greek divisions in terms of military capability. At the time Turkish divisions was composed of 2500-3000 soldiers beside which existed divisions with 300-700 soldiers. But in contrast to Turkish divisions, the Greek divisions had 7000-10000 with no problem whatsoever concerning armament equipment.
In November 1920 during which the preparations continued to establish a regular army, even though western and southern front commands were not ready to use its full capacity to found an orderly army with its logistic and administrative units, Nationalist forces’ commander Ethem Bey opposed to joining his troops to the army troops and did not follow the directives given by Colonel İsmet.
At the time of the Greeks’ forward operations, Ethem Bey commenced acting in a complete insubordinate manner. Hence, the Western Front’s commander Colonel İsmet, taking the control of the infantry forces under his command, launched an attack against the forces of Ethem Bey in Gediz. (20) On November 29th, 1920, Kütahya was obtained. And on the 5th of January, when Gediz was secured, right here a day later started the Greeks’ attack both from Uşak front and İnegöl. In these circumstances, the banishment operation against Ethem halted for a while. After the victory of the first battle of İnönü, on the 13th of January in 1921 another assault was carried out against Ethem and his forces winning them out. (21) As a consequence, Ethem Bey, defecting from the Turkish forces, joined the Greeks forces (22) and thus there left no opposition to founding a regular army.
In January 6th, 1921, the Greeks, with weakened forces, started advancing towards Eskişehir and İslâmköy -Banaz respectively from the direction of Aksu-Dinboz-Burçin and Uşak. Turkish command staff planned to fight the Greeks who were much more advantageous in terms of technical and mechanical equipment after they assembled their scattered soldiers. To do this, they had to make sure that the Greeks arrived to take their position as late as possible. Thusly, Turkish covering forces were ordered to leave gradually their positions. By this means, the Greek forces coming from the environs of Bursa could start combatting with the Turkish troops in the third day of the operation. Upon losing the defensive position into the hands of the enemy, a counterattack was engaged albeit not a successful one.
Because the situation worsened, on the night of the 10/11 in January 1920, the Western Front command decided to withdraw to Zemzemiye-Oklubalı line in Beşkardeş Mountain and there retrograde operation was set out. On the 11th of January during the reconnaissance mission it was ascertained that the Greek troops were also retreating upon which the Turkish cavalry troops engaged a chasing and stalker mission. (23) This was the first attack attempted with the regular army and whatever the reasons may be the fact that the Greeks admitted defeat and fell back heartened the Turkish nation.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha congratulated the Western Front commander Colonel İsmet with a telegram on behalf of the National Assembly. On March 1st, in 1921 Colonel İsmet gave a speech in the assembly which received an ovation. In his speech, while pointing out the panic and frustration of the enemy, he stated that the army’s greatness was to be respected both inside and outside the country. After this speech, the assembly promoted Colonel İsmet to the rank of brigadier general. (24)
The victory of the Turkish army at the first battle of İnönü paved the way for the Lausanne Conference held by Entente powers. Beside the representatives of the Ottoman Empire, representatives of GNAT government were invited to the Conference on the 21st of February in 1921 in London. In the London Conference, the provisions in the treaty of Sevres were presented again to the Turkish committee with several changes. The spokesman of the GNAT Bekir Sami Bey refused to accept these clauses in the Sevres stating that they would not sacrifice the National Oath.
When London Conference did not result within the terms of the Allied Powers, British led to another attack on Turks by provoking the Greeks one more time. On March 23, the Greek forces in Bursa who were reinforced with more men launched a second assault on Eskişehir. The Greeks knowing that during this period Turkish forces had gained time, employed more soldiers in İzmir. British were almost certain that after this attack Turks would have to accept the terms of the Sevres. (25)
The second battle of İnönü (23/31 March 1921) occurred in İnönü and Afyon. The Greeks advancing from Bilecik-Pazaryeri fought the Turkish forces on the day of the 27th of March in İnönü. Turkish forces retreated in the center and the left wing of their position. But, they were able to drive back the Greek troops at the end of 3-day resistance. When their second attack was repulsed as well, the Greeks had to abandon their position. The Greek troops who were in an advantageous condition in terms of arms and who outnumbered the Turkish forces were defeated heavily at short notice thanks to the astuteness of Colonel İsmet at the head of the Turkish army. The Turkish cavalries stroke with force to the retreating Greek army in Yenişehir plain. (26) The defeat of the Greeks were announced with a telegram written by the Western Front Commander Colonel İsmet to the President of the GNAT Mustafa Kemal Pasha in April 1st, 1921: “To our arms the enemy left the battlefield which is covered with their lifeless bodies” (27) to which Mustafa Kemal Pasha responded as follows: “You defeated not only the enemy but unfortunate fate of the nation. Today, entire nation to the back of the beyond together with our occupied lands is celebrating your victory.” (28)
After the second battle of İnönü, whole nation burst out with joy. Everyone in Ankara, young, old, woman, man, went to the assembly to hear the news of the victory. Later, they went to Namazgah to celebrate the triumph. (29) Celebrations were organized in other cities as well and felicitation telegrams were sent to the assembly. (30) A feast was thrown for the victorious soldiers at the hill of Metris accompanied with the flourish of the trumpets, and Zeibek, Laz and Caucasian dances were performed. (31) Fevzi Pasha told the battles of İnönü to deputies who were congratulating and applauding him loudly: “Victory belongs to the self-sacrificing and brave children of the nation.”
The battles of İnönü, of course, were not deciding battles. These could only be the beginning of movements of a great army in the Western Anatolia. It was because all the wars fought until the battles of İnönü were under a single command; they were not front operations which a central cadre conducted. In any case, there was not a central zone to avoid the progress of the Greek troops let alone units efficient enough to fight. That was why the battles of İnönü delivered the message to the Greeks that Anatolia was not easy to occupy.
In the aftermath of the second battle of İnönü, the government of the GNAT being recognized by all the European countries reinforced its position. While the trust grew stronger towards the government and army amongst the public, Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s authority over the GNAT and the Turkish nation strengthened. The victories won by the Turkish army led French and British occupiers to leave gradually from the invaded zones.
After this battle, the Turkish troops situated in the southern region of the Western Front were defeated in the war made with Greeks in Aslıhanlar and Dumlupınar in April, 1921 (32); therefore having to retreat to the defensive line in the east of Afyon.
The Greeks who could not succeed at the battles of İnönü were encouraged by these victories at Aslıhanlar and Dumlupınar and raised their invading forces in Anatolia to 175.000. During this time, the Greek emperor Constantin coming to İzmir tried to inspire his soldiers with confidence. Though outnumbered in ordnance, the Turkish army was also given additional equipment.
On the 10th of July in 1921 the Greek troops moving in the direction of Bursa and Kütahya-Gediz confronted with the Turkish forces across the front in Kütahya region. Due to the violent engagements (33) the Western Front commander ordered the troops to get back to the main line in the east of Eskişehir. (34) Retreating was carried out with delaying tactics conducted by the rear guards. Greek general Papulas wrote in his daily report that they were tracking the Turkish troops mercilessly and that he hoped Kütayha would completely be surrounded. Being the ancient capital of Phrygia, Kütahya with its 40.000 population at the time was conquered by Colonel Çuroyanis. The heir apparent and the staff officer came to Kütahya and were welcomed with display of affection of the minority group. The Greeks acquired 5000 captives, 168 cannons and caissons and 2000 camels in Kütahya.
The Greek army was ordered to destroy the Turkish army. So when the Greek attacks started again, the Turkish units tried to break the Greek line with assaults. But when this fails, İsmet Pasha asked for the advice of the General Staff and permission to pull back the forces to the east of Seyitgazi. Fevzi Pasha ordered the most powerful troops to be summoned in the east of Eskişehir-Ayvacık. When the Western Front command was in a difficult situation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha departed by train for headquarters of the Western Front in Eskişehir and he noted that it was necessary to gain time in order to defeat the enemy. (36) After determining the situation, it was decided that the army was to withdraw to the east of Sakarya. The flank situated in Eskişehir had to retreat as well for it could not hold their position together against the Greeks anymore. So, on the 19th of July in 1921 Eskişehir was captured by the Greek forces.
Turkish army withdrew to the east of Sakarya River in order to perform tactical defense. (37) This retreating led to a spiritual downfall because leaving an important part of the nation into the hands of the enemy even for a short amount of time was devastating for the soldiers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha who took all the responsibility for this struggle said: “We shall do the necessities of soldiery, and then we can endure other problems.”
The fall of Eskişheir provoked a dispute among the deputies in the GNAT and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was severely criticized by the deputies. The belief that the national cause was lost was now across the nation leading to a big breakdown. Moreover, it was proposed that the GNAT should be moved to Kayseri. (38)
Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister stated that they were going to demand more due to the victory of the Greeks. The Greek emperor Constantin, summoning the war assembly, noted that he wanted the forward operations to continue.
The withdrawal of the Turkish army to Sakarya started the debates over the loss of the war in the GNAT after the 25th of July. They all tried to find a responsible for the defeat. They found Mustafa Kemal Pasha guilty and accused him severely. The GNAT as a last resort proposed to appoint Mustafa Kemal Pasha as Chief Commander. With the law enacted on the 5th of August in 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was given the supreme military command authority for 3-month period. (39) According to the law, the decisions made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha would be statutory. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, after taking over the authorities of Chief Commander, issued an order named National Obligations on August 7-8 in 1921. (40)
Thus, with these orders whole Turkish nation prepared for war and started giving all they owned to the army to save the country from the enemy invasion. (41) After the release of this order, Mustafa Kemal Pasha went to the front with Chief of Staff Fevzi Pasha to inspect the army. (42) Mutafa Kemal Pasha expecting a new attack from the enemy gathered all the troops in Sakarya zone and commenced preparations for a conclusive battle. (43)
The Greek aggression which began on the 23rd of August in 1921, continued unceasingly on a line of 100-km along Sakarya River for 22 days and 22 nights. The Greeks were indeed successful at attacks launched on the left flank of the Turkish lines and even came almost 50-km near Ankara. Upon the break of the lines partly, on the night of 26/27 of August the Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal stated “There is no line defense, there is regional defense. And that region is the whole nation. Unless the every span of this land is ensanguined, it cannot be left” (44) and this order being enforced with body and soul by all the troops, the Turkish army won the battle. (45) After this battle, with the law enacted by the GNAT, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was given the rank of Marshall and honorary title for war veterans. (46) Fevzi Pasha was assigned full General and İsmet Pasha was assigned Major General. (47)
During the battles of Sakarya it was significant for İsmet Pasha to show the determination and spirits of the Turkish nation in the meeting he held with an Associated Press reporter on the 2nd of September in 1921. In his speech, İsmet İnönü said: “They are not going to defeat us because the logic of soldiery is against them. In the ceasefire, we demobilized 500.000 men and if need be we can recruit them. “(48)
The victory won by the Turkish army in Sakarya, reinforced the hopes and expectations about independence which were about to fade away and strengthened the trust towards the assembly and Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The battle of Sakarya was indeed a matter of life and death being a struggle engaged by Turkish soldiers at the cost of their lives.
The victory in Sakarya was a progress in terms of increasing the nation’s credibility in the international platform. The Allied powers who realized that Turkish army and Turkish nation were getting stronger day by day, offered peace making propositions beginning in March, 1922. These propositions were a changed version of Sevres which was one more time on the table. The Turkish government did not accept any of these proposals made in order not to sacrifice the National Oath.
The enemy who was defeated in the battle of Sakarya retreating to the east of Eskişehir-Kütahya-Afyonkarahisar line took a defensive position. They started reinforcing their troops along the line which was covered with precipices on both sides. And Turkish army tried to complete preparations parallel to this line.
In a secret session of the GNAT dated March 4 1922, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained that the goal of the Turkish Supreme Military Command was to launch a conclusive attack so as to throw the enemy from its position and to destroy them. However, it was necessary to reinforce the Turkish army in every aspect in order for it to strike one last time. During this time, the army’s ammunition, equipment and personnel needs were being supplied. Arrangements were being made in the range headquarters which were to provide a logistic support for the army and materials that were needed by the army were being produced in the manufacturing plants established in the country. During the preparations made for the attack, the whole army went through a strict military training.
With these current issues ongoing, the Supreme Military Command issue revived again in the GNAT. The deputies in the opposition objected to extending the duty of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the Chief Commander. But Kemal Pasha opined in the GNAT on the current situation that they would have devastating consequences if the army was left without a commander (49) and his duty as a Chief Commander was extended for another 3 months in the meeting held the day after (May 6 in 1922). And in the meeting organized on the 20th of July in 1922, the authority of Supreme Military Command, for an indefinite period of time, was given to Mustafa Kemal Pasha who had already won the trust of the Turkish army and the nation in every aspect.
While these debates were going on in the GNAT, the Chief Commander visiting the fronts found the preparations proper. The Turkish command cadre saw August fit as the time of the attack against the Greeks. (50)
The Turkish army evaluating the information collected in August by enhancing its intelligence secretly passed onto the preparations for the attack on the 6th of August in 1922. In the meeting held by the Chief Commander in Akşehir on the 20th of August, the plans made for the attack were discussed and it was ordered that the attack be launched cutting off all the contact with outside.
The offensive commenced (52) on the day of the 26th of August in 1922 with the order given by the Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the war headquarter in Afyon Kocatepe. (51) Even though the British claimed that it was impossible to pass the barriers made by the Greeks at least for 6 months proved to be wrong, because the Turkish army broke these barriers at short notice with the assaults engaged in on the 26th of August. The enemy had to withdraw from its position. (53) On the days of the 27-28 of August, the battle continued. The battle fought on the day of the 30th of August was captained directly by the Chief Commander and therefore it went down in history as the “Field Battle of the Commander-in-Chief (the battle of Dumlupınar)” (54). The cadre coming to Çalköy on the 31st of August and remaking assessments arrived at a consensus on chasing the Greeks. (55) Chief Commander gave the historic order right here:
“Soldiers, your first target is the Mediterranean. Go forward!” This order (56) enabled Turkish army to advance quickly and to pass the Afyon-İzmir line (350-400 km) in such a short time of 9 days. This blitzkrieg, going down as the fastest offensive operation in the world war history, had an important significance in terms of showing the determination and decisiveness of the Turkish army to save its nation from the enemy. The battle of Dumlupınar and the chasing operation began on the 26th of August in 1922 proved one more time to the world that the Anatolia belonged eternally to the Turks. The victory won on the 30th of August constituted a milestone in Turkish history.
During this operation against the Greek army, the Chief Commander of the Greek army Trikopis was captured with his staff in Uşak; many weapons and equipment were obtained. (57) On the 4th of September in 1922 the Western Front commander İsmet Pasha ordered that İzmir should be taken before it was destroyed and to capture the warships and cargo ships of the enemy which anchored on the shores of İzmir. (58) And on the 6th of September he gave a command to take necessary measures in order to prevent the Greeks burning down the villages and towns. (59) On the 8th of September İsmet Pasha demanded the First Army to mobilize its cavalry corps immediately and to capture İzmir unconditionally. (60)
On the 9th of September in 1922 the Turkish army entering İzmir cleansed the west Anatolia from the Greek invasion. (61)
During the battle, most part of the Turkish army started out an operation towards the straits from Kocaeli Peninsula. In İstanbul, the British were the only nation to have a hostile state of mind against the progress of the Turkish army, but when the principle of free passage from the straits was accepted by the Turkish part through the diplomatic negotiations, the problem with the British was resolved. Only the issue over the restitution of the east Thrace was left. The Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal Pasha ordered the east Thrace to be surrendered immediately. When the Turkish army was about to set about wide range preparations in order to take back Thrace, with France being the mediator and the attempts made by Russia and Italy, England changed its policy. On the 4th of October in 1922, the representatives of the Allied powers, Greece and Turkey convened in Mudanya. At the end of the Mudanya negotiations, Turkey being represented by İsmet Pasha signed the armistice treaty on the 11th of October in 1922. (62)
Armistice of Mudanya represented a big success achieved by the Turkish State in the international platform. Henceforth, the new Turkish state’s most important goal would be to sign an honorable peace treaty so as to establish a dignified place amongst the civilized world nations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
16 Kazım Özalp; Milli Mücadele, Ankara, 1971, p.151. Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı; Balıkesir ve Alaşehir Kongreleri, Ankara, 1967, p.278.
17 İzzettin Çalışlar, 61. Fırkanın Gediz ve Kütahya Muharebeleri, istanbul, Askeri Matba, 1932, 84
Sayılı askerî Mecmua’nın Tarih Kısmı, p.17.
18 Ali Fuat Cebesoy; Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, İstanbul, 1955. p. 516.
19 Türk İstiklal Harbi Vol II, Batı Cephesi, Part 3, Gnkur.ATASE Bşk.Publications, Ankara, 1966, p.42- 43.
20 Aydemir; p. 173-179.
21 Çalışlar; p. 66.
22 Baki Vandemir; istiklal Harbinde Demirci Akıncıları, İstanbul, 1936, p.13.
23 Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; Issue 52, Article No:1210. İ.Hakkı Tümerdem; Yunanlılarla istiklal Harbi, istanbul, 1939, p. 9-39. Fahri Belen; Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, Ankara, 1983, p.279.
24 Zabıt Ceridesi, v. 9, p.2.
25 Bilal Şimşir; ingiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk, v.ll , Ankara, 1975, p.432.
26 Sebahattin Selek; Anadolu İhtilali, Ankara, 1968, p.233. Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p.55, Article No:1255.
27 Nutuk, Ankara, 1982, v:2, p.394.
28 Selahattin ,Türk Kurtuluş Savaşında ikinci inönü Meydan Muharebesi, istanbul, 1933. 90 sayılı Askerî Mecmua’nın eki, p.140, Nutuk, v.2, p.394.
29 Nuri Köstüklü; “İkinci İnönü Zaferinin Anadolu’daki Yankıları”, Millî Kültür, Nisan 1991, p.83, p.53-54.
30 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi-1; Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Publication, Ankara, 2000, p. 280.
31 ihsan İdikut; ideal Komutanlarımızdan 4.Fırka Kumandanı Miralay Şehit Nazım Bey, İstanbul, 1952, p. 104.
32 Türk İstiklal Harbi Vol ll. Batı Cephesi; Part 3, p.567.
33 İdikut; p.123.
34 Türk istiklal Harbi Vol II., Batı Cephesi, Part 3; p.296.
35 Türk istiklal Harbi Vol II., Batı Cephesi, Part 4; p.337.
36 Ibid.; p.360.
37 Özalp; p. 181.
38 Fahri Belen; Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, Ankara, 1973, p.335.
39 Gizli Celse Zabıtları; v.ll, p.164.
40 Nutuk; p.417.
41 Alptekin Müderrisoğlu; Kurtuluş Savaşının Mali Kaynakları, Ankara, 1974, p.374.
42 Ismet Pasha resigned from his duty of Chief of Staff on August 5th 1921. Zabıt Ceridesi; v.12, p.20.
43 Müderrisoğlu; Sakarya, İstanbul, 1982, p.100. Belen, p.352.
44 Nutuk; p.419.Türk istiklal Harbi, Vol II. , Batı Cephesi, p. 65.
45 Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p. 69, Article No: 1516.
46 Nutuk; p.420.
47 Zabıt Ceridesi; v. 13, p.49.
48 Published in Akşam, Vakit and İleri newspapers.
49 Nutuk; p.442.
50 Türk istiklal Harbi Batı Cephesi,Part 2; Ankara, 1965, p.204
51 Abdurrahman Özgen; Milli Mücadelede Türk Akıncıları, İstanbul, 1973, p.154
52 Fahrettin Altay, İstiklal Harbimizde Süvari Kolordusu, istanbul, 1949, p.333. İzzettin Çalışlar; Sakarya’dan İzmir’e Kadar, Birinci Kolordu, istanbul, 1932, 87 sayılı Askeri Mecmuanın Tarih Kısmı, p.48.
53 Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p. 60, Article No. 1368.
54 Abdurrahman Özgen; Milli Mücadelede Türk Akıncıları, p.174. Belen; p.463. Gizli Celse Zabıtları , v.3, p.746.
55 Belen; p.477. Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p.61, Article No. 1392. Mahmut Goloğlu, Cumhuriyete Doğru, Ankara, 1970, p.313.
56 Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p.61, Article No.1398.
57 Belen, p.488. Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p.62, Article No.1406. Goloğlu; p.315. Çalışlar; Sakarya’dan izmir’e Kadar, Birinci Kolordu, p.90.
58 Çalışlar, Sakarya’dan İzmir’e Kadar, Birinci Kolordu, p.97. Belen, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, p.493.
59 Fahrettin Altay; İstiklal Harbinde Süvari Kolordusu, p.62. Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi, p.63, Article No.1423-1425.
60 Abdurrahman Özgen, Milli Mücadelede Türk Akıncıları, p.182.
61 Altay; p.65. Özgen; p. 193-199.
62 Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu; Trakya’da Milli Mücadele, Ankara, 1955, p.446. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi; Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi, Ankara, 1948, p. 158. Harp Tarihi Vesikalar Dergisi; p.66, Article No.1473.
