Associate Professor Melek M. Fırat
The policy Turkey followed during WW2 is the most criticised and/or defended period of Turkish foreign policy connected to President İsmet İnönü. Some think that İnönü missed a great opportunity by not entering WW2 and with his reserved and cowardly demeanor prevented post-war gain including the Dodecanese Islands. Others think that he saved the country from destruction.
In fact, the period of 1939-1945, was specific in Turkish foreign policy.; international developments were distinctive enough to affect internal politics and sensitivities were increased about foreign policy which was traditionally conducted by a limited staff. Thus the area came under İnönü’s close supervision. During that period, all correspondences in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were immediately forwarded to İnönü, whose meticulousness about foreign policy was well known, and stances were taken according to his directives.
İnönü who was attached to the tradition of the state, consulted various institutions and persons including Numan Menemencioğlu, the secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before making the final decision (WEISBAND, 1974:37-48; DERİNGİL, 1994:49-56), but during WW2, İnönü had the last word on the designation and carrying out of foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to know İnönü’s personality well so as to understand the foreign policy of the period and to be able to evaluate correctly the decisions taken; because the basic traits of İnönü’s personality were reflected in his decisions.
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir made a remarkable assessment about İnönü’s personality in the foreword to his book The Second Man. “ The second man….calculates meticulously where and how much risk is to be taken. He accepts dispute and struggle only on turning points where precise results will be achieved. In fact, he tries not to miss these points. The hero of this struggle is a small, reserved man who never surrenders to any authority unconditionally; a man of balance who trusts his own calmness, his values, his collectedness and his moderateness. (AYDEMİR, 1996: 6, 12) These characteristics, which put their stamp on İnönü’s personal and political life were like the summary evaluation of Turkey’s foreign policy during WW2: a foreign policy which was calm, calculating, balanced, and which did not give in to conditions. While providing justification for this line of conduct, İnönü said: “ The basic principle I embraced while deciding the foreign policy I adopted during the war was to know that a mistake committed at the beginning would be difficult to correct.” (WEISBAND, 1974:23). What was the aim of this policy that was carried out with such care?
The foreign policy that İnönü designated during WW2 had a single aim: to keep Turkey out of war. One of the important reasons for this was economic : to eliminate the damage that the country would suffer if it entered the war. Another reason was political: to protect the frontiers of the country, to adhere to the National Pact, for which the war of independence was fought and which was placed at the foundation of the foreign policy that was followed since 1923. Turkey did not want land from anyone nor would it give land to any country Therefore, while the main aim was to stay out of war, Turkey would never succumb to an attack to its frontiers and no hesitation would be shown to defend the country. During a period when countries were continuously enlarging their frontiers and the political map around Turkey was changing day by day, it is not difficult to understand the dimension of Ankara’s concern and the tactical changes made each day according to new conditions in order to save the day. In order to stay out of war, İnönü attempted to play a game of chess, that lasted six years, with Italy, USSR, Germany, USA and England all at the same time. What were the moves of this game of chess?
Turkey’s aim was the protection of the balance of power throughout the war and the continuation of its out- of- war stance in this balance of powers. From Ankara’s perspective, the conduct of Italy, which concentrated its attention on the Mediterranean, was more alarming than that of Germany; it was Mussolini, not Hitler, who threatened the frontiers. Again, the important issue for Ankara was that Europe should not come under the domination of a single state and from this perspective, USSR’s gaining strength disturbed Turkey. Throughout the summer of 1939, Ankara continued the alliance negotiations with England and France on the one hand, while on the other hand she negotiated with USSR to include her in this alliance. However, Stalin was suspicious of the Allies’ reluctant approach and with a tactical change signed a non aggression treaty with Germany on August 23,1939 to gain time and space, which disrupted Turkey’s plans. Saracoğlu’s empty handed return from Moscow, where he had gone to ensure a separate alliance with USSR, and the intimidating demands of the Soviet authorities caused Turkey to worry about USSR at least as much as she did about Italy. Therefore, negotiations with the Allies were accelerated and on October 19, 1939, the English-French-Turkish alliance was signed. The main provisions of the agreement revealed that Turkey was no longer neutral in the WW2 that started on September1, but she had provided the conditions that would enable her to stay out of war. In case of an attack on Turkey by a European country, England and France would give all the help they could. In return, Turkey would give all the help she could in case of a war promoting attack by a European country on the Mediterranean area, which would involve England and France because of the guarantee they had given to Greece and Rumenia. However, with the protocol no.2 which was added to the agreement Turkey declared that she would not be forced to an act which would cause or result in an armed dispute with USSR. Moreover, with a military contract and a private agreement it was decided that England and France would give Turkey military and financial aid. Turkey’s obligations would begin only after the allies fulfilled their responsibilities.(SOYSAL, 1989: 606-609) Inonü, whose dexterity in diplomatic negotiations was well known, did not refrain from putting forth this conditition in the negotiations with the Allies throughout the war.
In the first period of WW2, which lasted from 1939 until June 22, 1941 when Germany attacked USSR, that is , the period when the Allies faced great defeat before Germany , Turkey was faced with the pressure of the Allies. The war in Europe spread to the Mediterranean when Germany attacked France and occupied Paris,and when Italy entered the war on June 13, 1940. According to the agreement of 1939, Turkey was under the responsibility of giving every kind of aid to England and France. On the one hand, the Allies were applying diplomatic pressure on Ankara to enter the war; on the other hand, some of the politicians and journalists who were captivated by Germany’s success were pressurizing the government by frequently expressing that it should be militant.
However, İnönü who was on the helm of foreign policy, and those around him had clearly designated the final aim. Turkey would be away from the devastating effects of the war unless there was an attack on her frontiers. Turkey had no soil to give anyone nor did she have any designs on anyone’s soil. Therefore she was not going to embark on an unpredictable adventure in return for the promise of some land. By employing the refinements of diplomacy in face of the pressure from the Allies, the protocol no.2 of the 1939 agreement was put forward and it was stated that if Turkey entered the war, she would be face to face with USSR who had a non aggression treaty with Germany. Moreover, such a decision would be against the Allies because if Turkey, who was powerless before Germany, were to be occupied, the Allies would have to open a new front in the Middle East. Ankara, who had convinced the Allies, prevented criticism within the country by applying a tight censure on the press and by silencing negative voices when necessary. In this period when Germany controlled Western Europe except England, Turkey’s biggest concern was a German- Soviet reconciliation performed over her. In fact, the Germans, by printing archive documents after the invasion of France, inflicted the first blow on the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey by announcing that Turkey consented to the Allies’ plan to bomb Baku. (KOÇAK, 1986: 129-136) However, Turkey continued to stay out of the war until 1941 despite the pressure from the Allies,by putting forth her Soviet reservation.
In 1941 Germany, who realized that she could not bring England to heel, decided to head east in order to complete Italy’s unsuccesful war with Greece dated October 28 1940, and to put a tight leash on the Balkans so as to provide the safety of the right flank in the war with The Soviet Union; she began to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece. By May 1941, all the Balkans, including Crete, were under the surveillance of Germany either by agreement or by the use of military force. Although there was a mellowing in the Turkish-German relations, the advance of the German army in the Balkans was observed with anxiety. In fact, Germany’s success in Western Europe had impressed Turkey and in 1940 a new trade agreement had been signed between the two countries and Turkey had resumed its sale of chromium to Germany. During the discussions of this agreement, the Berlin Ambassador, Hüsrev Gerede, had met with people who shaped German foreign policy, beginning with Hitler, and explained Turkey’s policies regarding the war despite her alliance with England and France, and stated that Turkey did not have an attitude against Germany. Germany also did not want to take Turkey on, and wanted to have good relations with Turkey before attacking the Soviet Union as she knew Ankara’s concern related to Moscow. The German decision makers were sure that Turkey would side with Germany in case of a victory against the Soviet Union. In fact, on February 28, 1941, in the beginning of the Balkan operation Hitler had sent a letter to İnönü where he stated that he had ordered his army entering Bulgaria not to approach the Turkish frontier and that an operation against Turkey was out of the question. In his reply to this letter on March 12, İnönü stated his pleasure from Hitler’s decision and clarified once again Turkey’s determination to stay out of the war as long as there was no attack on its land.
Upon Germany’s heading towards the east, Stalin, who knew that sooner or later it would be the Soviet Union’s turn, started negotiations with Turkey via the mediation of England. On March, 18-19 the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Eden and Saracoğlu met in Cyprus and Eden wanted Turkey to enter the war if Greece was attacked and Yugoslavia entered the war. Saracoğlu refused this wish. The Turkish-Soviet negotiations ended on March 25 with a joint declaration, according to which if one of the sides was attacked, the other would keep its neutrality. Thus, Turkey succeeded in continuing her non-combatant position through the negotiations with both Germany and the Allies. The Allies who were caught short had to accept Turkey’s attitude and dreaded to increase their pressure.
Turkey’s balance policy was again put into trouble when on April 3, 1941 the pro-German Raşit Ali Geylani seized the power by a coup in Iraq which was under British control. Germany could send help to Geylani only over Anatolia and thus increased its pressure on Turkey. This put Turkey in a difficult position, and not wanting to be sorrounded by the Axis Powers she refused Germany’s request of a transit pass. To show her determination on this issue Turkey crashed a German plane which entered her airspace on April 23. This was understood as a sign of deterioration in the relations but that did not happen. The issue was closed when Geylani was overthrown in May and the Allies again seized the surveillance in Iraq. Thus, the Turkish-German negotiations continued without an injury. The negotiations which England was also informed about, ended on June 18, 1941, with the signing of the Turkish-German Non-Aggression Pact. (ATAÖV, 1965:92-95)
The policy Turkey followed in the period of 1939-1941 can be summed up as the ability to stay out of war through a balance policy by abiding by the agreement with the Allies on the one hand and on the other hand by signing a Non-Agression Pact with Germany who continuously enlarged the area under her control. İnönü, who was a good chess player, made his moves by careful calculation of the balance of powers and arrived at this result by emphasising two basic points: creating a free movement area by causing doubts that he would move over to the other side if pressed too hard, and showing his decisiveness about fighting to the end in case of an attack on his country.
Germany’s attack on The Soviet Union by way of Poland on June 22,1941, was the beginning of a new period in WW2 that would continue until 1943. This was a period when the supremacy of Germany was accepted throughout the world, and the Allies were extremely hard put despite USA’s entry into the war in December 1941. However, the news of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union made Turkey heave a sigh of relief as she had feared a Soviet- German bargain over herself and had worried about Soviet Union’s gain of power. On the other hand, Turkey had succeded in staying out of war until that date and resisted the Allies’ pressure in entering the war by putting forth her Soviet reservation, but this possibility was ruled out now. However, the Allies decreased their pressure on Turkey who, they worried, would gravitate towards Germany and consented to her staying out of war. In fact, when England and the Soviet Union occupied Iran on August 25,1941, they felt the need to reassure Turkey and eliminate her apprehension. The Allies’ showing Turkey such an understanding sensitivity was not without reason. They saw that Germany’s success impressed Turkey and worried that Ankara would enter the war, not being able to resist Berlin’s pressure. In fact, the closeness between Turkey and Germany reached its peak during that period. Turkey, who was affected by the German victories against the Soviet Union, condoned the passage of a German warship through the Straits on July 9, and this practice continued throughout the year 1942. In reply to Russia’s protests, it was stated that they were Merchant vessels. In the summer of 1942, with Refik Saydam’s death, Şükrü Saracoğlu became the Prime Minister and Numan Menemencioğlu was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There were those who associated the acceleration of the closeness between Turkey and Germany to these changes in the government. However, we believe that the conjuncture was effective, the previous policies were continued, and these policies were in fact determined from Çankaya. Germany’s success did not only influence Turkish foreign policy, but this foreign policy had reflections on domestic policy. During this period,when the effects of the ‘Turan’ movements increased,and the leftist press was censured, certain practices, which are still disputed today, put their stamp on Turkish political life. With the imposition of the Wealth Tax in November 1942, there was a gravitation toward racist practices.
In 1943 the new and final period of WW2 started. After the Stalingrad war, the German armies began to retreat on every front and as it became clearer that the Axis would be defeated, the Allies especially England who made its postwar plans on the prevention of the Soviet Union from becoming too powerful, increased their pressure on Turkey to enter the war. President İnönü, who applied a balance policy throughout the war, was having difficulty in continuing this policy and now there was the added worry of being alone with Moskow who it was understood would gain strength after the war. It was very difficult to apply a policy that would eliminate these two worries.
Immediately after the Stalingrad war, on January 30-31, 1943, Churchill and İnönü got together in Adana. Turkey put forth the military agreement and the private pact as its justification for staying out of war and stated that the entrance of Turkey, which was not equipped with modern weapons, into the war would mean a definite defeat and would give more damage to the Allies. These legal and political justifications were met with understanding by Churchill. İnönü’s basic worry while going to the Adana meeting was Moscow’s post war policy. The British Prime Minister stated that only if Turkey entered the war with England and The USA would she not be left alone before her northern neighbor and would have assurance.
Throughout the year 1943, on the one hand Turkey stayed out of war by putting forth the deficiency of equipment in her army, while on the other hand she condoned the passage of the German warships through the Straits and continued to sell chromium which would sustain Germany’s war power. What enabled Turkey to apply this policy was the discord of England and The USA in their war plans. England wanted a second front to be opened in the Balkans to prevent Moscow’s spreading out after the war, while the USA understood the ally Soviet Union’s forming a safety corridor and insisted on the second front to be opened in Normandy as it pulled the rivalry frontier towards mid-Europe. In this case, Turkey was ablto stay out of war by depending on the USA but received the greatest reaction from her northern neighbor as the policy she followed gave damage to Moscow.
On November 28- December 1, 1943, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt met in Teheran. When the British Prime Minister brought forward the issue of Turkey’s entering the war, Stalin who was after the calculation of post war advantages expressed clearly his reluctance on the issue and stated that it did not interest him whether Turkey entered the war or not. Moscow was to punish Ankara for the policy it followed during the war later on. Still it was decided to appeal to Turkey once again on the issue of entering the war.
On December 4-7,1943, Churchill and Roosevelt, returning from the Teheran Conference, met with İnönü in Cairo. On December 3, İnönü who came to Adana secretly, found two airplanes waiting to take him to Cairo: One was piloted by Roosevelt’s son-in law and the other by Churchill’s son. İnönü, by choosing Roosevelt’s son-in-law’s plane, displayed a delicate diplomacy and gave the signals of the policy he would follow during the conference: continuing his out of war status by relying upon USA. The İnönü-Churchill bargaining caused a lot of sweat for the British Prime Minister in Cairo. In the end, İnönü accepted in principle to enter the war on condition that the Turkish army should be provided with sufficient equipment. However, considering Turkey’s transportation conditions, it would take three years to provide the requested war equipment. Turkey returned from the Cairo Conference without making actual changes in her official policy.
1944 was a very difficult year for Turkey: the relations became tense not only with the Soviet Union but also with England. While the discussions with the Turkish military officials about the provision of the equipment for the Turkish army continued, the length of the list given by the Turkish officials and their unwillingness about any compromise caused the British delegation to leave Ankara ; the Turkish pilots who were being trained in the British base in Cairo returned to Turkey. The relations between Turkey and England broke off and the Allies stopped informing Turkey, whom they did not trust, about their war plans.
İnönü had based all his policy on the war period but now post war negotiations and plans were being made and opposing voices were beginning to be heard even within CHP: İnönü had protected the country from the destruction of the war but could not provide the post war security.
The year 1944 began with signs of differentiation in Turkish politics. The Chief of the General Staff Fevzi Çakmak who was known as ‘pro German’ retired because of age limit and Kazım Orbay was appointed in his place. Salih Omurtag was assigned as Deputy Chief of General Staff instead of Asım Gündüz. Again in the same year, important names of the ‘Turancı’ movement Nihal Adsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Zeki Velidi Togan, Hasan Ferit Cansever and Alpaslan Türkeş were arrested. The developments in domestic politics constituted the clues to the beginning of a change in foreign policy and were evaluated as Turkey’s attempts to become closer to the Allies.
Indeed, when England and the USA sent a diplomatic note to Turkey on April 14, 1944, stating that the selling of chrome to Germany should be stopped, otherwise they would enforce an economic embargo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced on April 21 that the delivery of chrome to Germany would be stopped. Immediately after this, the issue of German warships passing the Straits was put on the agenda. Throughout the war, the Allies had warned Ankara about the German ships passing through the Straits and each time Ankara replied that they were Merchant vessels. In June 1944, with England’s pressure, a German ship passing the Straiıts was stopped and searched for the first time; it turned out to be a warship. Germany was protested and tight control of German ships was begun. Numan Menemencioğlu undertook the responsibility and resigned with the justification that his policy was not approved by the government. When Turkey’s policy of staying out of the war and the balance game played while applying this policy was named as ‘pro German’ and the conditions showed that such policy was becoming harmful, the Minister of Foregn Affairs was sacrificed from the İnönü, Saracoğlu and Menemencioğlu trio who formulated and applied the abovementioned policy .
Following Menemencioğlu’s resignation England and the USA wanted Ankara to break with Germany. Turkey fulfilled this request on August 2, but waited until February 23,1945, to declare war on Germany.
WW2 was a sui generis period in Turkish foreign policy:
1) A balance game, shaped by İnönü and applied by Saracoğlu-Menemencioğlu, was played. The basic aim was specified as staying out of war and taking the country, whose economy was not developed, through this difficult period with the least possible damage. To realize this aim a balance policy, which was determined according to the course of the war, was followed between the Allies and the Axis. Turkey’s basic worry was The Soviet Union’s gaining strength. Until 1941 she feared a Soviet-German negotiation performed over herself and depended on the 1939 agreement. From 1941 on, with Germany’s attack on The Soviet Union, this worry disappeared and during the years 1941-1943, when Germany’s power was at its peak, Turkey got closer to Germany, convinced the Allies of her policy and waited for Moscow to lose strength. In the period between 1943-1945, when it became difficult to apply this policy, Turkey prevented the relations from breaking off by taking advantage of England’s fear of The Soviet Union’s gaining power after the war, and succeeded in staying out of war again.
2) Turkey had stayed out of war throughout WW2, but was not neutral; she was legally bound by the 1939 agreement. Even those who criticise İnönü’s policies cannot ignore his lawful attitude. While applying his policy of staying out of war, İnönü took care to act according to the justifications provided by the 1939 agreement. He found legal support for his political attitude by depending on the Soviet reservation until 1941, and after that by depending on military and private treaties and was thus able to legalize his policy.
3) During WW2, Turkish domestic policy bore the traces of the developments in the foreign policy. Until 1943, the pressures applied on the left, the ‘secret’ support for the Turan movement and the application of the Wealth Tax constituted the German effect on Turkey who was out of war. After 1943, however, the arrest of the members of the Turan movement reflected the influence of foreign policy.
The foreign policy followed by İnönü during WW2, continues to be the most studied and discussed topic. A large number of people criticize İnönü for causing Turkey to miss important opportunities because of the ‘coward’ or ’timid’ policies of that period. However, it was unthinkable to deplete the human and physical resources of a newly established state for “The Second Man” who had been raised during the collapse of the Ottoman, who had been succesful all his life because of his prudence and careful consideration, who had been the”National Chief” in a Turkey devoid of its “First Man”, who knew well the economic and military conditions of the new state, and who had been among the people to establish the Turkish Republic in 1923 , despite all impossibilities, via carefully calculated diplomacy as well as military power. The target was to keep the country away from the destruction of war and this target was reached because of the perfect diplomacy that was followed in spite of all the pressure. We believe it is not easy to say that the success in foreign policy was provided in the same degree in domestic policy.
Resources
ATAÖV, Türkkaya. Turkish Foreign Policy 1939-1945. Ankara, AÜSBF Yayınları, 1965
AYDEMİR, Şevket Süreyya. İkinci Adam. C.1, İstanbul, Remzi, 1968.
DERİNGİL, Selim. Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye nin Dış Politikası. İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1994
KOÇAK, Cemil. Türkiyede Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945). Ankara, Yurt, 1986.
SOYSAL, İsmail. Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (1920-1945), C. 1, Ankara, TTK, 1989.
WEISBAND, Edward. 2. Dünya Savaşında İnönü’nün Dış Politikası. Çev. M. Ali Kayabal, k.y. Milliyet Yayınları, 1974.
