Written by: Prof. Dr. Zeki ARIKAN
– History
– Mudanya Armistice Treaty (3-11 October 1922)
– Its Repercussions
– Birth of a Great Diplomat
– Bibliography
Battle of Dumlupınar started on August 26 in 1922 eventuated in nothing flat with great success and the Turkish army reached İzmir in Mediterranean by discharging their duties given by Chief Commander Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Mustafa Kemal Pasha informed the foreign consuls in İzmir who wished to meet with him that they could come together in September 9 at Nif. He was there on the exact date but the consuls were not because since the Turkish army had already conquered İzmir, it was not necessary anymore to meet up. Saving all the cities in such a short time such as İzmir, Eskişehir, Bursa, Manisa and Aydın which were under the invasion worried the Allied powers and England wished us to declare officially if we were in war with them or not. During the attacks, the Allied powers had to resort to the GNAT for an armistice. After the Prime Minister Rauf Bey delivered the report about the situation to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the commander-in-chief said that they had liberated West Anatolia and the ceasefire could only concern the Thrace. Signing a ceasefire, the Mudanya Armistice Treaty, was easy and it was here at this conference where West Front Commander İsmet Pasha gained his first great success in the field of diplomacy.
Whole nation was celebrating the moment of victory during the time in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrived at the İzmir government office with a roadster on 10 September. Celebration telegrams were sent from all sides to İzmir. The victory had echoes abroad. Indian Musulmans, the Prime Minister of Iran, Afghan Ambassador, Russian Ambassador were the first to celebrate the victory. Moreover, even the British, French, Italian and American Marshalls and consuls visited and congratulated the Commander of the First Amry Nurettin Pasha on September 10. But, of course, there was no doubt that these congratulations disguised worries as well. Even though the Greeks were defeated, behind the curtain, it was the Allied powers who actually lost the war and the British were the head of them. All of them were feeling uneasy for their years of planning “the world order” seemed to come to an end. As a matter of fact, the British Admiral Brock and the British Consul Lamb in İzmir expressed their concern in their visit to Nurettin Pasha on September 10. During these dialogues which could be accepted as the beginning of the political negotiations , Brock asked Nurettin Pasha whether the Ankara government was in war with them or not. Pasha replied, “Do you regard the GNAT government as your enemy or your ally?” upon which the admiral responded: “We were in war with the Ottomans and four years ago we gave up on it. We had never started a war with the GNAT government and therefore we do not consider you our enemy.” As a result, it was decided that neither of the parties were in state of war. Nevertheless, the Consul Lamb saw it necessary to meet with Mustafa Kemal Pasha. During the meeting on September 12, he attempted to ask for assurance and did not hesitate to make more requests. Furthermore, he even behaved insolently saying, “Are you declaring a war against the British government.” Thereupon, Mustafa Kemal Pasha retorted to him and said that it was up to England to decide. The consul turned to Admiral Brock saying that the Turks declared a war against England. Worried admiral wrote a letter on September 13 in which he stated that he wished to know his sincere thoughts. Mustafa Kemal Pasha agreeing with the opinions of the commander of the First Army, notified, “We do not have a political relationship between us; it is desirable that it should start.”
However, the Prime Minister Lloyd George was not willing to give up his pro-rigidity policy even though his position was shattered considerably. British Council of Ministers gathered on the 7th of September in 1922 and decided to protect the zone of neutrality against Turkish army if need be. On September 11, the British, French and Italian forces were deployed in Çanakkale. On the 12th, England offered the other two nations to cooperate. On the same day, a British ferry replete with ammunitions departed for Çanakkale comprising of British and Italian units. Leaving rather weak British units around Gebze and Bostancı, the major units summoned at Caddebostanı-Göztepe station on the line of Büyük Çamlıca-Bulgurlu-Kuzguncuk. The British was getting ready to defense İstanbul and its surroundings upon this line. No preparations made prevented Turkish army to advance towards the straits. The British Council of Ministers meeting on September 15 called its allies to summon force in order to avoid Mustafa Kemal Pasha from invading İstanbul. The council decided to ask for support from the dominions. The next day, Churchill, Secretary of State for the colonies, publishing a notice stated that he considers “the indefinite and true freedom of the straits as a matter of life and death” and for that, he was prepared to do the necessary.
The internal state of England did not look promising at all. It was being shattered with internal problems. The Troubles (ethno-nationalist conflicts in Northern Ireland) broke out again and IRA putting aside the rupture in itself commenced preparations to go against the common enemy England. In addition to that, England’s position in India was in danger as well. The German and Turkish intelligences’ successful works had drawn the attention of Musulman Indians on the Turkish national struggle. Others followed the revolt raised in 1919 at Pencap. Moreover, Anatolia’s victory in 1922 provoked victory demonstrations of the public in many states where Musulman Indians populated. During this time, Gandhi had already started to organize the first resistance. France’s internal state was not in good condition, either. First signs of the independence movement in Tunisia were igniting. And all these brought up the question of whether the Allied powers should risk another war. Besides, except New Zealand, Dominions, Romania and Yugoslavia did not accept England’s demand for aid. France and Italian governments said that they could only be engaged in diplomatic initiatives. In response, high commissioners of the Allied powers in İstanbul sending a diplomatic note to the representative of İstanbul Hamit Bey in Ankara on September 18 stated that “they desired preserving the neutral status of the zone under the invasion of the Allied powers in İstanbul and of the straits.” Italia notifying that it could not side against Ankara retreated its forces from Çanakkale. Moreover, within 24 hours, France followed Italy by ordering its soldiers to withdraw.
England was left alone. France sent General Pellé to İzmir. Pellé tried to persuade Mustafa Kemal Pasha to respect the neutral zone. In response to this, Mustafa Kemal Pasha said that neither he nor the GNAT government knew of such zone and that the aim of this operation was to follow the defeated enemy. The Turkish army, however, entered this allegedly neutral zone with a decisive albeit non-provocative attitude with their weapons down. A conflict was imminent. The British was constructing entrenchments around Çanakkale enclosing them with barbed wires. Mustafa Kemal Pasha realized that the situation was about to worsen dangerously and started focusing on politics in order to solve the imminent crises. However, this did not mean halting our military determination. The negotiations in Paris Poincaré, Curzon and Sforza were in acrimonious state. The divergence emerged among England, France and Italy. There was a tension between Turkish and English soldiers for entering the area presumed a neutral zone by the Entente powers. Hereupon, on September 26 General Harrington sent a telegram to express his worries about the situation and requested the Turkish soldiers to retreat from the west of Erenköy and Biga, which they accepted as neutral zone. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal as well sent a telegram to General Harrington. He wanted them not to allow the returning of Greek navy that had been driven out İstanbul and not to suppress anymore the people in İstanbul. In addition, he said that he did not find the destruction of the weapons and ammunition of the Turks in İstanbul and Çanakkale right and that “ to avoid any misunderstanding ,” the advancing Turkish units were ordered not to move farther in order not to cause any conflict. Nevertheless, the crisis still maintained its importance. Right during this dangerous time, a statesman Frank Bouillon who was a friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to İzmir to meet with the Chief-in-Command. Bouillon, at the same time, conducted a meeting with the Prime Minister Rauf Bey and the minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) Bey. He played an important role overcoming the crisis. In accordance with the pledge given by Bouillon on behalf of the Allied powers, it was decided that they were going to start negotiations for a just peace, but they also underlined the fact that since they had halted the military operation, the Thrace should not, even for a day more, stay under the rule of Greek army and government. It was also expressed that including Edirne, as far as the west of Maritsa should be immediately evacuated and left to the rule of the GNAT. (29 September) Although the British cabinet gave the war order to General Harrington, he did not fulfill this mission given by the government. Harrington was one of the Generals avoiding war.
Mudanya Armistice Treaty (3-11 October 1922)
Mustafa Kemal Pasha offered the Allied powers to start the negotiations in Mudanya. In the meantime, he notified that he had chosen the West Front Commander İsmet Pasha as the representative. The aim of this negotiation was to stop the military operation and especially to prevent a conflict that might occur between Allied powers and Turkish troops. The actual cause for Turkey was Greeks leaving Turkish lands and yielding Thrace as far as the Maritsa River. It was only then possible to make peace. The Turkish committee chaired by İsmet Pasha was comprised of Western Front Chief of Staff Asım Gündüz, Lieutenant Colonel Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, Major Seyfi Düzgören and Red Crescent’s Vice President Hamit Bey with two clerks. It was found appropriate that the Chief of Staff Fevzi Pasha and Refet Bele should stay in Mudanya. General Harrington, General Charpy and General Monbelli represented England, France and Italy respectively. Greece appointed General Mazarakis and Sarıyanis as their delegates. However, they did not attend the meetings although they had come to Mudanya.
The meetings were convened on Tuesday, October 3 in 1922 at 15:15. Ismet Pasha was the one to greet all the Allied generals individually and assumed the role of a chairman of the meeting. Franklin Bouillon was seated in the corner of the room as an observer. İsmet İnönü gave the first speech. Nevertheless, it was not quite easy to provide an armistice. Indeed, meetings were such tense that Şevket Süreyya Aydemir said, “It would not be wrong to name the Mudanya Conference as the Mudanya War” emphasizing the situation. Especially, it was the reluctance showed by the Allied powers about abandoning Thrace caused this suspense. İnönü explains this situation in his memoirs as follows:
“In the first three days of the Mudanya Conference, Thrace was the only matter that was discussed. When the first session started, this was the issue that I raised and to which I drew their attention. We had been at war and there had stood our enemy, right in front of us. We defeated the enemy and followed them. We drove them out the Anatolia. But, this advancing stopped due to this Mudanya Conference and this cannot continue for a long time. Waiting, we cannot give the enemy to gain time and let them make preparations. Therefore, it is necessary to evacuate the enemies from the country as soon as possible. I stated my argument in this way. Discussions take place. When the other matters in questions are solved, this will be solved too. It will be, with the other issues…”
The debates were so tense that from time to time it seemed to be going nowhere. Indeed, from 5 October to 9 October, a sign of new war was about to emerge. Because on October 5, although the French part accepted abandoning Thrace, the representatives of Britain and Italy claimed that they had no authorization to make a such decision, and postponed the meeting to the next day in order to resort to their governments. This decision immediately led Mustafa Kemal Pasha taking an action. Upon the divergence of the meetings, on October 6, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent a telegram to İsmet Pasha following below:
“Advance to İstanbul on October 6-7 as it is commanded if they are not willing to give Thrace back to the GNAT government on the 6th day of October as provided in the terms decided in İzmir.”
It seemed that for Turkey a war was on the edge of waging. As Şevket Süreyya was saying “probably, there has been no one stuck between war and peace as much as İsmet Pasha had been on October 6 in Mudanya.” The GNAT government was observing the situation carefully, too. Mustafa Kemal Pasha talked about the probability of going to war and demanded the Council of Ministers to inform the assembly. The deputies spoke of their true thoughts and criticized freely. Durak Bey said that they the government should keep following its agreeable tone in order to avoid a war. Because he claimed that if, the war was to start again it sure would include British as well and they can reorganize the Greek soldiers who had already withdrawn to Thrace, and therefore, war should be the last resort. Emin Bey, however, reminded that the delayed meetings did not seem advantageous for Turkey and so the conference should be finished at short notice as possible. And some deputies stated especially that they should stay loyal to the National Pact.
While the GNAT government was discussing the telegram by İsmet Pasha, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sending a confidential order wanted him to fulfill key rulings below:
The Greek forces should leave Thrace in 15 days.
The evacuated areas should be left to the GNAT government’s representatives.
The Allied powers and their commissions remained in Thrace should not have any intentions of monitoring or invading the GNAT authority.
It should be stated clearly that Thrace belongs to Turks.
As long as Karağaç stayed in border of Edirne, it was to remain under the control of the Allied states.
The number of gendarme should not be limited.
In addition to these, the telegram also included issues such as not raising the number of the Allied powers’ soldiers and not expanding the invaded areas. The Entente power, however, did not wish to evacuate İstanbul especially for it would mean their “ certain defeat .”
In a notice declared by İsmet Pasha, he clarified the situation ongoing at the time for the public. On the next day, that is October 8, no meetings were held. And İsmet Pasha was trying to figure out a way to end this tension. He expressed his thoughts in his memoirs as follows:
“We gathered on October 7. General Harrington said that he wanted to delay the conference for he could not get in contact with Lord Curzon because he had gone to Paris. This tension continued until October 9. In the meantime, there were no meetings conducted. On the ninth, the French and British generals came to Mudanya and said that they wish to see me in person for a friendly discussion. We sat down and talked. But the situation did not indeed seem good at all. I said that my authorization to stop advancing was over and now it was time to take an action at will. They said that they were not content of the fact that our troops had crossed the neutral zone in İzmir. They also expressed the concerns of General Harrington for the British and Turkish troops were so close in Çanakkale and therefore in an uneasy situation.”
The meeting resumed on the night of October 9, nevertheless, was smoothly conducted. According to Harrington, İsmet Pasha was calmer. When the project planned by the Allied were read, İsmet Pasha said “J’accepte!” (I accept it) and added that he would be delivering this to his government and therefore he wanted the conference to be postponed until 10 October in the afternoon. This proposal was accepted. The GNAT government approved of the project. But, on the tenth, the conference were not held. This was because the discussions with the Greek deputy were taking longer than expected. At last, on the morning of October 11 at 6 o’clock, the Military Convention of Mudanya was signed and started to be in effect beginning on October 14-15 in 1922.
The Military Convention of Mudanya (Convention Militaire) was comprised of 14 articles. According to this document, the conflict between Turkish-Greek forces ended. The Greeks were to evacuate Thrace within 15 days. 8.000 Turkish gendarme including civil service officers were to acquire Thrace. The cession of the authority was to occur within 30 days. In order to supervise the evacuation and rendition, an Allied unit of seven battalions was to take charge. Within 30 days after the submission was over, they were to leave this area. West Coast of Maritsa River and Karaağaç were to stay under the invasion of the Allied powers until a treaty was signed. The straits and İstanbul were to be submitted to our civil administration, but the Allied powers could stay in İstanbul and straits until peacemaking on condition that they kept the number of forces same. Until peacemaking, the Turkish forces could not pass the line between Çanakkale Strait and İzmir and could not deploy armed forces in Thrace. The Greek representative felt obliged to assert to the conditions of the convention. Upon signing the convention, Mustafa Kemal Pasha thanked General Harrington and sent celebration telegrams to the Defense of the National Rights group and municipalities.
As professor Şerafettin Turan emphasized, the Armistice of Mudanya Treaty brought an end to the ongoing conflict since 1911 and saved the country from an invasion and provided the deliverance of İstanbul to the rule of Turkish government. We must accept the fact that the Armistice of Mudanya Treaty was not just an ordinary pact. It bears political elements; therefore, it has an international significance as well.
The treaty led to a big victory manifestations. İstanbul University Faculty of Science decided to give honorary professor to İsmet Pasha who had won this great victory.
Of course, the news about the treaty echoed around the world too. They were now talking about Lloyd George whom they thought should go. The French were being criticized of their willingness to yield to the demands of the Turks in the British press and being held responsible for leaving Britain alone. It was a shocking event in Britain when İsmet Pasha demanded the Thrace to be evacuated by the occupant forces and to be handed to the Turkish rule within a month. This was also a sign of how Britain was desperate at the time.
The peace between the Turks and British was received quite favorably in England. News published in Times wrote that General Harrington reached an agreement with İsmet Pasha thanks to his common sense and that there were no provisions in the treaty that degraded Turkish honor. Manchester Guardian Journal wrote that the treaty was a cure for all the problems for the people in İstanbul and that all the worries were at last gone. According to this journal, İsmet Pasha represented “a nation which was full of love of freedom and kneaded with triumph.” Arnold Toynbee pointed out the political fate in future in his article (October 16 1922) in the same journal. A map was also added. Toynbee stated that the Mudanya Treaty did not include the west Thrace and the future of the area was to be decided upon a peace convention.
Signing of the treaty led to a positive atmosphere in France as well and the public were finally able to heave a sigh of relief. Right before the conference was held, a French journal had already written, “There comes the dangerous times.” In the streets, questions like “What if a war breaks out?” “What would Turks do?” “What would we do if the battle occurs there?” Some other French journals gave headlines stating, “Whatever happens in the east, France wants peace.”
After these worrying and stressful moments, placing the Armistice of Mudanya in effect were welcomed with joy. Some French journalists especially were mentioning the important role of the French with the positive progress made. The British were being held responsible for the divergence and delay of signing the treaty. War ending Mudanya Armistice treaty was great news for the French public. Because this, according to the public, was “the success of the French policy.” “ The Turkish victory was a tough lesson for Greek boasting and proud stubbornness of Lloyd George. ”
Şevket Süreyya stated that İsmet Pasha had gained a new identity with the Mudanya Armistice and said: “After Mudanya, İsmet Pasha will become a new political identity for the nation. Indeed, after the treaty, the soldiery and commandership have now been left behind and İsmet Pasha has been reborn as a political identity and the Second Man.” In this context, it would not be so wrong to say that the Mudanya Treaty led to the birth of a new diplomat. He did have some experience in the field of diplomacy, though. For instance, in 1907, Captain İsmet was assigned in a military commission due to a territorial conflict. He had an argument with a Bulgarian Major. The President of the Bulgarian Commission General said to him, “Captain, one day your country will be proud of you.” Captain İsmet looked at the Bulgarian general with a dazzled face and then left. Indeed, in the years of 1910-1912 when Staff Major İsmet was working under the command of Ahmet İzzet Pasha in Yemen, he played a vital role in suppressing the revolt of İmam Yahya as well as in important moments in soldiery and politics. In the first years of the World War One, the communication he conducted with the German officers when working in the Ottoman headquarter, gave him the advantage to acquire the command of language skills for diplomacy. Even more, he was able to anticipate real intentions of Germany for Turkey by asking questions to one of these officers. It was then he understood that the Germans did not come to go to Turkey. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that Enver Pasha considered appointing him the Chief of Staff.
The report given by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Colonel İsmet (May 20, 1917) is a proof of his capabilities that a diplomat has: “He is devout, active, highly intelligent and broad-minded. He is in command of his subordinates and steady at making decisions under difficult conditions. He has an enormous perspective of military competence and insight with a quick mind…” In addition to these qualities, Colonel İsmet was also an honest person who had won the trust and hearts of the people around him. Inarguably, these features of his character made him uniquely suited for a diplomat.
Therefore, it was without doubt very convenient for Mustafa Kemal Pasha to assign İsmet Pasha with superior authorization for the Mudanya Conference. This is surely a proof of the trust that the Chief- in-Commander had in the West Front Commander. We should also bear in mind the fact that he took the lead as the commander of a victorious army assuming the role of the chairman in the first day of the meeting. Indeed, it was his success at Mudanya that led him being chosen as the chief delegate once again by Mustafa Kemal Pasha for the conference of Lausanne. Enver Ziya Karal emphasized that the Armistice of Mudanya was a victory won by “the iron will” of İsmet İnönü.
Harrington’s observations on İsmet Pasha during the negotiations are of importance. At first, İsmet Pasha did not make a strong impression on Harrington, but then he accepted how he was a courageous and audacious. The parts taken from the letter of Harrington published by Şevket Süreyya give us insight about this matter:
“When I first saw İsmet Pasha, he did not leave a very lasting impression on me. He, on the surface, was a small and short person. He did not talk much. Additionally, -it is hard to tell whether this was deficiency or in some circumstances a qualification- he was hard of hearing.
I believe he was more or less 42 years old. Initially, he seemed very persistent with his relationship with us. I barely saw him laughing at all. He would smile a bit only when he said “How are you” or “Goodbye”. Of course, he was acting in accordance with the strict order he received from Ankara. He was great with details.
He would scrutinize every line, always take his notes and would not tell what he thinks unless he senses a secret meaning. But he was always kind…”
İsmet Pasha had his first experience with diplomacy in Mudanya Conference. But, he would have to confront with an international and more inclusive diplomacy exam in Lausanne.
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