Prepared by: General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Study
Mustafa İsmet was registered in Sivas Military School (Primary) in 1892. Graduating in 1895 Mustafa İsmet attended the Sivas Military High School for a year. In 1897 he went to the Artillery High School. On the 14th of February in 1901, he entered Mühendishane-i Berri-i Hümayun (Imperial School of Military Engineering) and was graduated as lieutenant in September 1, 1903. (1)
Finishing the Turkish Military High School at the top of his class, Mustafa İsmet entered the Military Academy and graduated top student in his class as staff captain in September 26, 1906.
In October 2, 1906, he started his duty as the commander of 3rd battery of 8th field artillery regiment in the Second Army in Edirne. Interning as a staff officer Mustafa İsmet taught tactics and gunnery to the officers in the artillery division while learning to be a troop officer. Serving in the Ottoman-Bulgarian frontier commissions, Captain İsmet joined the Committee of Union and Progress through Ali Fethi Bey’s conduct in 1907. (2) Mustafa İsmet was now a secret member of the Committee. The aim was to end the despotism of Padishah, to establish the constitutional monarchy and to save the country from the disastrous situation. And thus, the politic life of İsmet İnönü started.
When 31 March Incident broke out, Captain İsmet İnönü went to İstanbul as staff officer of the 2nd Cavalry Division which was sent from Edirne to İstanbul to suppress the revolt. The Division commander was Şevket Turgut Pasha and the Chief of Staff was Kazım Karabekir. Quashing the rebellion Captain İsmet returned to Edirne and left the Committee of Union and Progress and stopped being engaged in politics. Now the politics was of secondary importance while the military service was prioritized for Captain Mustafa İsmet.
Lieutenant commander saw that the Turkish domination over Rumelia was about to come to an end when he attended the first trip arranged for the staff officers to the southwest part of Rumelia in 1909 summer. Constitutional monarchy period did not seem to be a new progress for the Ottoman Empire. Balkan nations and states’ hostility and readiness for combat deepened day by day about the Ottoman Empire and its ruling. Mustafa İsmet witnessed all and formed various opinions about the future of the country.
The maneuvers performed by staff officer of the Cavalry Division Captain İsmet Bey during the army maneuvers between the First and Second Armies in 1910 in Thrace was appreciated by İzzet Pasha.
Izzet pasha was charged to suppress the revolt which broke out in Yemen in 1910. In the composed forces of Yemen under the leadership of İzzet Pasha which carried authority over the 7th army included Captain İsmet in the general staff of the organization. Captain İsmet Bey was the assistant and advisor of İzzet Pasha in military, political and administrative affairs. He was promoted to the rank of Major owing to his services and efforts in battles of Beytus-Şaban in April 26, 1912. Being assigned to the Chief of Staff of Yemen Army, Major İsmet finished the uncompleted works of İzzet Pasha for he had to go to the Balkans after the Balkan Wars broke out. Going to Kaffet-ül-Uzer to negotiate with İmam Yahya, Major İsmet could reach an agreement after compelling negotiations. The agreement made by Major İsmet and approved by the Ottoman Empire was put into force.
Yemen was a place where Major İsmet could try and enrich his military and personal skills. He improved himself in Yemen: he advanced his French and German and read books on professions and culture. Major İsmet started being interested in Western music in Yemen for the first time. His interest for Western music continued in the following years and he became a regular listener of the Western music in Republic’s Ankara. (3)
In March 1913, Major İsmet returned to İstanbul by the command of the Office of the Ottoman Chiefs of Staff and was assigned to the General Headquarters Staff Operations in Hadımköy. Major İsmet served in the right flank during the Edirne operation in June 1913. He was appointed to the 1st department of Supreme Headquarters by the Ministry of War in June 11, 1913. He was the military advisor during the treaty of Constantinople in September 8, 1913. He conducted investigations of some of the responsible generals and superior officers in Eastern and Western Army of Balkan Wars in November 1, 1913. He served as staff officer first in the 3rd Department of the General Staff and then in the 1st Department of the 1st Army in December 15, 1913. He was appointed to the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army in August 3, 1914 and to the Supreme Headquarters’ Chief of the first Department in December 2, 1914. (4)
Major İsmet believed that after the Balkan Wars a general war of which Europe will be a part would break out. He also thought that Ottoman Empire should remain impartial declaring mobilization during the war. In contrast to the general view he thought that because the war would last a long time Ottoman Empire should expand the mobilization so as to grow stronger and after the war it would not matter who won for they would be weak and so it would be easy for Ottoman Empire to preserve its territorial integrity. (5)
Major İsmet Bey was concerned about the future. If Germany would fail it would also be their ruin. But İsmet Bey sensed a danger in Germans’ victory as well. Because the chief of Staff Operations of the Supreme Military Command Lieutenant Colonel Feldmen used the words “strict allegiance and solidarity” and when İsmet Bey asked what he meant by these words he avoided answering. İsmet Bey believed that strict allegiance meant to be dominated by Germans and he told Ali Fuat Erden what is to be done if such situation rises as follows: “If I lose faith in the independence of my country throughout one generation, I would quit military service and become a history and geography teacher in a high school to prepare them for the next independence struggle.” He did not become a history and geography teacher in a high school. Instead he became the commander of the Western Front and the Chief of Staff. (6)
Major İsmet Bey was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in November 29, 1914 with Ottoman Empire going to the World War 1. When he was the chief of the 1st Department of the Supreme Headquarters, he received 3 years of seniority in June 29, 1915.
When Lieutenant-colonel İsmet was working in the Supreme Headquarters he established intimacy with Enver Pasha. It was very important that he would make himself accepted as trustworthy and competent by Enver Pasha who was quite strict and unapproachable. During his task in the Supreme Headquarters he stayed away from the internal conflicts and was even chosen by Enver Pasha to soothe the disagreements between the chiefs and Marshalls in the German Staff. During these tasks his honesty and sympathy in his attitudes which made him successful were the reflections of his character. As there was no concept of specific working hours for İsmet Pasha, his dedication to work provided him success and distinction. (7) Lieutenant-colonel İsmet İnönü being rewarded with the silver Legion of Merit in August in 1915 owing to his services, wanted to be transferred to the front on his own accord towards the end of 1915. This was because at the time the Ottoman Empire went to World War 1 fighting in six fronts, and so Lieutenant-colonel İsmet did not want to stay in the headquarters. Thereupon, he was promoted to the Chief of Staff of the Second Army on the 9th of October in 1915. And on the 14th of December in 1915, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel.
The troop friendship of Colonel İsmet and Mustafa Kemal began in the Second Army. Mustafa Kemal was assigned to the Army Commander of the Second Army after the Battle of Gallipoli. Under his command, Colonel İsmet worked first as the Chief of Staff of the Second Army and then as the Corps Commander. Their close cooperation has importance for them to get an understanding of each other’s personality and mentality. In the following years, this friendship also played a significant role in terms of national struggle and establishing the new state. This troop friendship with Mustafa Kemal was effective for İsmet Bey in terms of being transferred to Anatolia, immediately taking a part in the Council of Ministers as soon as he arrived in Ankara and being assigned to the Chief of General Staff.
In 1916, the East Front was restless. The Russian Army was ceaselessly attacking with very powerful forces against the Turkish troops. The aim of the Russian Army was to get to Mediterranean Sea first through Harput (Elazığ) lowland, then Malatya and finally Iskenderun. In order to stop the Russian forces, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had to defend an 80-km front.
Mustafa Kemal liberated Muş and Bitlis from the Russians on the 26th of July in 1916. The contribution of Colonel İsmet at this front drew attention. When Mustafa Kemal was promoted to the Commander-in-chief of the Second Army, he assigned the Chief of Staff Colonel İsmet to his Corps Commander of the Fourth Army. Colonel İsmet took office on the 30th of December in 1916. Continuing this duty until the 1st of May in 1917, Colonel İsmet later was assigned to the Palestine Front. At this front, he first served as the 20th Corps Commander, then as the 3rd Corps Commander.
During his duty as Commander-in-chief of the Second Army, the military efficiency report that Mustafa Kemal wrote about Colonel İsmet Bey who was working under his command as the Corps Commander is intriguing in many respects. The report that was written by Mustafa Kemal for Colonel İsmet who left to go the Syria front reads as follows:
Diyarbakır 20. V. 333.N.4499
(1916)
Mustafa Kemal
To the Caucasus Army Group Command at Kemah,
My remarks on the qualities and competence of the Fourth Corps Commander Colonel İsmet Bey who has been recently assigned to the 20th Corps Command are submitted as follows:
As devout, active, highly intelligent, broad-minded, steady under difficult conditions, quick at making decisions and dominant leader, he works hard to acquire what his Corps Army needs and succeeds at obtaining them.
He has an enormous perspective of military competence and insight; he is decisive, brave and intuitive.
He will always undertake the responsibilities as well as the duties both for sake of the army and that of the nation.
During his post of Corps Commander, albeit without a grand war, he proved to succeed at any significant operation through his intuitions and authority.
His social intercourse deserves admiration. He is able to establish a relationship with his subordinates and superiors within the framework of mutual respect and trust.
The Second Army Commander
Mustafa Kemal
In Mustafa Kemal’s military evaluation of İsmet İnönü what is intriguing is that Mustafa Kemal did not only mention the services that İsmet Bey already gave in the army but also what services he will be giving in terms of serving the nation. (8)
It is possible to say that one of the reasons why the military record was this pleasing is that the provisions that Colonel İsmet supplied from the Fourth Army when he was the Chief of Staff of the Second Army. Ali Fuat Erden who was a friend of İsmet İnönü from War Academy spoke of this as follows: (9)
“We went to see Cemal Pasha with İsmet İnönü. İsmet Bey describes the conditions in which the Second Army was. The army was starving and almost bare. There were no beds and medicine in the hospitals. İstanbul could not send the needs and the ones that were send conglomerated in the station could not be transported to the front. Despair and destitute, I said “Well, if so then I myself should go and see the owner of the nation and here I stand before you.”
The owner of the nation! Cemal Pasha did not comment on these words. In silence, he accepted gracefully this compliment. İsmet Bey impressed Cemal Pasha with two words. So, he gave me the orders: “Whatever we can provide, give them.” Thousands of camels, hundreds of carriages, animals, clothes, military cloaks, laundry, provisions, and for the hospitals, mattresses, blankets, equipment and medicine were supplied.
The camels were going to be transported from Maan to Rasülayn and there they were going to go hundreds of kilometers to the north to the ice desert. It was for sure that due to cold these camels were to die before reaching the front. I mentioned my concerns and İsmet Bey said: “Just once they carry the supplies to the front and then they can die, we can make rawhide sandals out of their skins.” The journey that had begun in the desert of Sinai Peninsula ended in frosty Çabakçur (Bingöl).
When İsmet Bey arrived Şam Ali Fuat Erden offered him to replace the mission place with him owing to the impression İsmet Bey had made on Cemal Pasha and İsmet responded: “No. I cannot do anything, either. There is a limit to what can be done with intelligence, experience and wit. If mistakes and malicious things could have been prevented with wit and intelligence, then the world would have been bed of roses. (10)
When Colonel İsmet was assigned to the third Corps Commander, an attack plan by General Falkenhayn’s quarter was presented to Enver Pasha. According to this plan, the Eighth Army in Sinai front was to be the main power and to protect the Eighth Army’s Gaza-Tellüşşeria front while the Seventh Army taking Birüssebi as base of operations was to circle the desert blockading rear of the right flank of the enemy so as to threaten the access in the direction of the channel and to drive the enemy into the sea.
The plan was perfect in theory. However, it was within the bounds of possibility that this siege could end in war because the British entrenched their fortification rear of the right flank reaching the coast and moreover even if the siege would stretch out to the sea the British could defend their position turning their back to the sea as done in Gallipoli. On the other hand, because what lies behind the enveloping army was desert, they could get into a scrape.
In August and September, the British with mounted troops reconnoitered the West and South fronts of Birüssebi. They dug pits and made measurements. These preparations showed that they were planning an attack on the area. (11)
In response, the Brussebi garrison was reinforced. By the middle of September, the garrison was made up of these forces: a very weak cavalry division (two regiments and a battery), 27th Infantry Division (7 battalion, 4 batteries), an infantry regiment from the 24th Division (48th regiment), an infantry regiment from the 16th Division (3rd Regiment) and an artillery battalion (2nd Battalion of the 39th Regiment). These forced had 4400 rifles, 60 machine guns and 28 field guns.
On the night of the 30/31 October when Colonel İsmet learned that many cavalrymen who were assumed to be two divisions were moving towards a pit point 20 km south of the town send cavalry division to the northeast ridges of the town in order to prevent the enemy cavalry from encircling Birüssebi. He left a backup battalion in the Tellüssebi hill which was the center of the zone situated 5 km east to Birüssebi. Doing this, he was able to bridge the gap 5 km-long between the left flank of the front fortified with the other two battalions of this regiment and Tellüssebi.
When the British infantry drew 400-500 m near to the position, some of them opened a destruction fire to the wire fences which were indeed poorly constructed and charged toward noon. After the violent battles, the British were successful to occupy the position of the 67th Regiment. And the west- south front was split.
Colonel İsmet ordered the 27th Division troops to withdraw behind the Sebi valley across Birüssebi in the direction of east-west.
The British Cavalry started moving toward Tellüssebi from the east between 8 and 9 o’clock. Here, after the six-hour combat the city fell upon which Colonel İsmet gave the withdrawal order. (12) During the withdrawal Colonel İsmet and his staff officer narrowly escaped being taken captives by the British Cavalry Brigade. The British captivated 70 officers and 1458 soldiers.
Marshall Falkenhayn wrote in the report given to the Supreme Military Command as follows: “The 8th Army Commander did not give clear instructions to the 2nd Corps Commander when it was not possible to stay in Birüssebi. Later, when the situation became even more delicate, he could not see the need to gather a backup force close by Tellüşşeri. On the contrary, he did not fulfill any of my advice on the ground of the water scarcity. According to my opinion, there is only one explanation for these omissions that Von Kresschtein Pasha has been disregarding the operation of the British against Birüssebi until the last moment and perceived it as ostentation.”
This report compromised the serious interrogation and allegation of the German General by the German Marshall. (13)
The British conducted forward operating with advanced and superior reinforced forces. During these operations, the Arab rebels and guerillas under the British command fought against the Turks. In this area, Turks were in a rather unusual situation because on one hand they were unwanted by Arabs and on the other they felt obliged to defend the Arabs. As all the Arab soldiers left their troops with their weapons, the power of the units’ troop basis weakened.
The third Battle of Gaza broke out with Birüssebi attack and ended with Jerusalem’s fall. The pitched battle lasted 39 days in the quadrangle of Birüssebi-Gaza-Jaffa-Jerusalem. With the fall of Jerusalem, there left only one sacred city for Muslims. And that was beleaguered Medina.
After the fall of Jerusalem, the 3rd Army Corps (Colonel İsmet) took up their positions in the north of the city, which is the way to Damascus while the 20th Army Corps (Ali Fuat Pasha) in Eriha-Amman Street in the north of Jerusalem. Both of the Army Corps withdrew behind Damascus seeing that it was still not safe even though they had formed an order with the inner wings of their troops in order to contact with each other. During withdrawal, the Corps Army under Colonel İsmet’s command was stuck in a difficult situation. (14) The withdrawal operation of the 3rd Army Corps proceeded as such: “On the night of 21st of September, the 3rd Corps Army formed a front against Gözele valley in the south and west of Tammün. Though the enemy’s operation had ceased, because it was not possible to establish communication with the Army Command, the Corps Army had to withdraw to Tubas. It was deprived of communication for lost Corps Telegraphy Signal Company was captivated by the enemy.
The 8th Army Commander ordered the 3rd Army to approach the Jordan River when passing Tubas. Thereon, Colonel İsmet sent a platoon under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Nasuhi and composed of two infantry squadrons, a cavalry and employment company to the passageway. Following the way, the corps sentry troop went astray and was enslaved.
The Corps Army moved to east from Tubas on the night of 22/23 of September. When arrived to Abu Malik, they confronted with the enemy. The Corps Army was surrounded by the enemy forces all around. They had to take position in a 2-km area. But it was not possible for the Corps Army to hold the line in this pressed situation. Because there were only 10 rounds per weapon and 1000 rounds for munitions left. Moreover, they ran out of water and food supply. Regiment and division commanders said to the Corps Army Commander Colonel İsmet that they wished to end the battle. Colonel İsmet stated that giving up was against the honor of a soldier. The commanders attempted to take a minute upon which the Corps Army Commander Colonel İsmet said: “I would kill the person who dares bringing such document.”
Colonel İsmet was against yielding to the enemy but the situation was getting worse. Soldiers in dispersed form raided the Valley Melih in crowds. The 3rd Army Commander Colonel İsmet decided to make a move to pass the Jordan River because there was no time to waste. He made his decision that the Corps Army was to pass the river by running the blockade of the enemy who drew near the west of the passageway. In order to ensure the safety, the machine guns were deployed where it required. The 1st and 11th Divisions given different positions started moving towards the passageway. When the 1st Division sloped down to the west lowland of Jordan, the vanguard confronted with the enemy cavalry and commenced fighting. On one hand the division was combatting with the enemy, on the other it tried to make diverse parts of the division to advance secretly through the ravines to the passageway. Meanwhile, the 11th Division tried to pass the river by proceeding in the direction of south. At the moment, the Corps Headquarters were in a position where they could see the surroundings in Bisan where the troops left for the passageway. Seeing that the 11th Division was able to approach the passageway without casualties, the Corps Headquarters as well decided to take this path.
When the enemy cavalry realized that fighting soldiers of the 1st Division ran out of munitions, they dived into the 1st Division with the help of its artilleryman and took some of the 71st Regiment as captives. Encouraged by this success, the enemy cavalry positioned its artilleryman in the farther south and opened fire to the passageway of the 11th Division. Meantime, another enemy cavalry who was presumably fighting with the 20th Army Corps headed for the 3rd Army Corps upon the withdrawal of the troops and blocked the 11th Division’s movement. The offence by the enemy cavalry resulted in many captives of the 147th Infantry Regiment. Despite this, the other soldiers of the 11th and 1st Divisions and the Corps Headquarter started to pass the river by drawing near to the passageway. Because the passing was done under the fire of the enemy’s artilleryman and machine guns, many soldiers martyrized. While the Corps Headquarter was climbing the hills at the east of Şeria, the enemy cavalry who pushed the 3rd Cavalry Division to the east marched to the passageway from the east of Şeria and killed many of our soldiers. Another enemy force which came through the river disabled the parts of the Corps Army coming from the north forwarding the last passageway operation.
The troops with their Army Corps and Division Headquarters went down below the troop’s basis and even though they managed to pass the river, they were completely exhausted. Besides that, they had to set off in order to move away from the enemy. This time, they climbed over the Aclun Mountains which had no proper paths to follow. During the journey, the 3rd Corps Army encountered the 20th Corps Army and its troops and together they went to Evun. The 3rd Army Corps, albeit suffering losses, was saved thanks to the determination and command of Colonel İsmet.
The 7th Army Headquarter, the 8th Corps Commander and his soldiers, the 7th Army Headquarter troops and 24th Cavalry Division Company arrived to Evun. (15)
It was decided that with the left forces, the 4th Army was to head for Homs and the 7th Army for Aleppo. The 4th army split apart. And only the dispersed forces under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha were left.
On the 5th of October in 1918, when Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Colonel İsmet and Ali Fuat Pasha arrived Aleppo, the city was in riot. As a result, they left Aleppo as well. The last battle was fought in the north of Aleppo, Katma. After this battle, the Armistice of Mondros was signed turning the battle at this front a complete debacle.
The Committee of Union and Progress which was the head of the war as well as responsible for it, resigned in October 14 1918 substituted by Ahmet İzzet Pasha’s Cabinet in which Colonel İsmet was assigned Undersecretary of Ministry of War (Ministry of Defense) and he continued his duty until the 22nd of November in 1918. Ahmet İzzet Pasha who conducted the process of signing of the Treaty had to abdicate the grand vizier ship and after two weeks Undersecretary İsmet Pasha was dismissed of his post. Instead, he was appointed military adviser to the Peace Preparations Commission in December 29, 1918. Owing to his authority and appropriation as Corps Commander, on the 4th of August in 1919 he was selected for “General Directorate of Military Council Membership and Procedure.” His duty here lasted for 8 days and afterwards he was appointed as a member in a commission which organized “correction of gendarme and police.” The reason why Colonel İsmet changed duties was because he was a close friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha who now was in Anatolia.
KAYNAKÇA
1 Ali Fuat Erden; ismet İnönü, Ankara, 1999, s.22,. Türk istiklâl Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri; Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayını, Ankara, 1989, s.216.
2 Erden; İsmet inönü, s.41, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç; ismet İnönü, İstanbul, 1946, s.23. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir; ikinci Adam, İstanbul, 1968, s.4 6.
3 Aydemir; s.79.
4 Türk İstiklal Harbine Katılan Tümen ve Daha Üst Kademelerdeki Komutanların Biyografileri,s.217.
5 Erden; a.g.e.; s.66.
6 a.g.e.; s.150.
7 Aydemir; s.90- 93.
8 a.g.e., s .103 -104’te bununla ilgili vesikanın 17 Mayıs 1959 tarihli gazetede yayınlandığını
yazmaktadır.
9 Erden; s. 105-106.
10 a.g.e; ismet İnönü, s.108.
11 Albay İsmet, Sina Cephesi’nde 3 ncü Kolordu komutanlığına atandığı sırada bu bölgede ilginç bir olay olur. ingilizlerin bu cepheye taaruz edecekleri beklenmektedir. Tam o sırada Türk keşif kolları çölde bir çanta buldular.Bu çantada İngilizlerin bütün taaaruz plânları bulunuyordu.Türk cephesinin sahil kısmını idare eden 8 nci Ordu Kumandanı Alman Von Kresschtein, bu plânlara inanarak muharebe tertibatını ona göre teşkil etmiştir. Albay İsmet Bey ve Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) ile diğer Türk kumandanları buna inanmamışlardır. 31 Ekim 1917 tarihinde İngilizler Han-ı Yunus üzerine değil Birussebi’de Albay İsmet’in kuvvetleri üzerine saldırmıştır. Aydemir, s .114.
12 Erden; s. 134.
13 a.g.e.; s.135. Ortaç, s.44.
14 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Sina-Filistin Cephesi, IV.Cilt. II Kısım, Gnkur.Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1986, s.673.
15 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Sina-Filistin Cephesi,s.675- 676.
