Written by: Prof. Dr. Zeki ARIKAN
– Election of İsmet Pasha
– Journey to Lausanne
– Depart for Lausanne and the start of the Conference
– The Draft presented to Turkish delegation
– Discussions
– Bibliography
Election of İsmet Pasha
Signing the Armistice of Mudanya, Ismet Pasha gained his first important victory in the field of diplomacy. Soon after that, İsmet Pasha would be representing Turkey in the Lausanne conference, which was to certify the independence of Turkey, and would go through one of the most significant experiences of his life. As Şevket Süreyya underlined: “Even if İsmet Pasha did not have another involvement in our recent history, he would still occupy an unforgettable place with all the difficulties he had to go through and with his resistance in Lausanne”.
After the Armistice of Mudanya, England, France and Italy decided that the negotiations should be held on November 13, 1922 in the city of Lausanne of Switzerland and demanded representatives from İstanbul beside the GNAT government in order to contract “an agreement which was to end the war in the East”. Summoning İstanbul government together with the GNAT government was nothing more than bringing two opposing parties face to face. This tactic recoiled and Great Britain government was hoist with its own petard by bringing an end to the sultanate when they called İstanbul government to Lausanne. To the offer made by the last grand vizier Tevfik Pasha to participate the conference in Lausanne together, the answer of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was decisive and incisive: “…the State of the Republic of Turkey can and shall only be represented by the GNAT government in the peace conference…”
It was quite daring for the sultanate to take the credit for the great victory, a sultanate which stirred up revolts terrorizing all Anatolia in order to silence the national struggle and which sentenced the commanders of the National Independence War to death. Crossing the limits even more, the grand vizier asked for a representative chosen by the GNAT government with a special directive to be sent to İstanbul immediately. This was a bizarre sign that the pro-sultanate and pro-caliphate still believed that after this great triumph everything was going to be the same as it had been.
In the Resistance Organization group, Mustafa Kemal Pasha gave a speech on October 31, 1922 that was about the indispensability of abolishing the Ottoman sultanate. Many long discussions took place in the assembly gathered on November 1. Mustafa Kemal Pasha took the floor and gave a long oration, which the history could not forget and was scientifically permanent. This oration was the history of establishment of the sultanate and caliphate with an unbelievably accumulation of knowledge and wide vision. Mentioning the history of Islam and of Turkey based upon historical events, he explained that the caliphate and sultanate could be separated, that the competent authority of independence and of national sultanate could be the GNAT. Because the sovereignty now belonged to the nation, there was no more a sultanate. However, the turbaned members in the commission who were responsible of introducing the law draft in order to abolish the sultanate made the discussions drag out; trying to state that the sultanate could not be separated from the caliphate by giving examples from the Canon law and Sharia. Upon the interference of Mustafa Kemal, everybody realized the “truth”. As a matter of fact, within two hours, the law draft was completed. On the same day, it was accepted in the general assembly with great joy. After 16 days, with the pretext of not feeling secure, Vahdettin secretly went under the protection of Great Britain. In order for Vahdettin not to be an instrument of sedition with the title of caliphate, the GNAT appointed Abdülmecit Efendi as the caliphate (November 18, 1922).
The place where the allied powers decided to hold the conference was not appropriate for the Turks at the time being. Greeks and Armenians who resided in Lausanne were trying to create malicious atmosphere for the Turks. Intensified throughout the war, the reaction that was directed towards the Ottoman Empire formerly, was now being aimed at Turks. Nevertheless, it was believed that the Swiss who were deceived by lies would learn the truth and would take the side of the rightful one. It was due to this that Turkey did not object Lausanne to be chosen as the meeting place. But, who was to speak for Turkey in here? Which diplomat was to defend the rightful case of Turkey to the whole world in the middle of Europe and acquired the required outcome? This was, as Prof. Cemil Bilsel had put it, “as fierce duty as leading the National Independence War towards a successful conclusion.”
It was known that the Allies had split in opinion during the Çanakkale crisis and even more; there was a public in France who had supported our War of Independence. But, this did not mean that the divergences were to continue amongst the Allies during the conference. On the contrary, there was a risk of them agreeing upon common interests ganging up against Turkey. In short, Turkey was going to “fight against all of the states and all of the history” in Lausanne. Moreover, this war was not going to be an easy one to be won, either. Lausanne was retaliation rather than a convention. Indeed, heavily defeated Greeks who had suffered “the little Anatolia Disaster” were not the ones welcoming us. The Turks would have to confront a heavy task in Lausanne as to answer in account of the whole history of Ottoman. In this regard, we see that Ghazi had chosen İsmet Pasha making the most practical decision. According to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Minister of the Cabinet Rauf Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal Bey and the Minister of Health Rıza Nur were to be the members of the delegation. However, Ghazi was not certain if this delegation chaired by Rauf Bey would succeed at vital issues for us. Rauf Bey considered himself weak. He wished İsmet Pasha to assist him as his advisor. Nevertheless, there could not be expected much of service provided by İsmet Pasha as an advisor. But Ghazi was of the opinion that “if İsmet Pasha were the chairman, then maximum advantage would be obtained.” After some meetings, Mustafa Kemal Pasha made his decision. He asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to confidentially resign and to provide İsmet Pasha to be elected instead of him. Yusuf Kemal Bey had already said to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that İsmet Pasha was the one to accomplish this task. That was why assigning İsmet Pasha for this task did not cause a problem.
In the oration, the event is explained as follows: “Only after that, as a fait accompli I assigned İsmet Pasha as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then said that he was going to be the chairman of the delegation in the peace conference. Pasha was surprised greatly. He apologized explaining that he was a soldier. But finally, he accepted my offer regarding it an order.”
In the work titled Tarih IV Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (History IV the Republic of Turkey) which was written during the time of Atatürk and which Atatürk scrutinized undoubtedly, how this choice was appropriate is being explained below:
“Great Ghazi knew that İsmet Pasha was the one to comprehend his views about political interests provided by Turkish victory for the Turkish nation and that he was the one to follow and impose ideas and demands in a conference, especially in an international one.”
“Those days, there were people who were not pleased with this decision. And yet, there were no one but İsmet Pasha who could manage this type of task in those days. In return of such trust, Ismet Pasha proved Mustafa Kemal Pasha right. Ali Fuat Pasha, in his memoires written afterwards, complained about not benefiting from the Ottoman diplomacy in Lausanne and considered it as a fault. I wonder what experiences of a diplomacy which had signed the Treaty of Mondros would be used. If he had expressed his thoughts in those days, I believe that İsmet Pasha would have said this “You don’t say!” which he used quite often that it had almost become a saying. Because the Ottoman Empire was a “Sick Man” in the eyes of the West. If the West thought that it was in his best interest that his patience should live, he would continue his treatment. What was interesting about it, the Ottoman diplomacy believed that they represented a “sick man” and could not see themselves as equals to the European diplomats. They were being reprimanded in the international congresses. In the congress of Berlin, Bismark scolded the Ottoman diplomats, and Clemenceau in the Paris Peace Conference insulted Damat Ferit Pasha. On the contrary, İsmet Pasha, as it can be seen below, resisted about equality and never made concessions about it. Therefore, a person who was to chair the delegation responsible for going to Europe should represent a new mentality and new spirit. And this person should be someone who was in search of absolute independence and who could defend it. That was why many people could not understand the importance of appointing İsmet Pasha the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief Delegate. It was only those who knew him well appreciated this decision.
Well yes, did İsmet Pasha knew of the rules and procedures of diplomacy? Did he speak languages and understand the conduct of diplomacy? It was not necessary for İsmet Pasha to be professional diplomat in order to defend the right of Turkey. On the contrary, his situation was in advantage of Turkey. Moreover, he spoke French and German. He was acquainted with the world politics. He had prescient instinct, though he mentioned that he being amateur put him in some difficult situations from time to time. About the problems he had when dealing with the subject of capitulations he said “this occurred partly because I started being an amateur diplomat right from the soldiery.”
When İsmet Pasha talked about the discussions in Lausanne at the first conference of the seminar organized by the Turkish Historical Society in the 50th anniversary of the Republic (23 September 1973), he said that in the end they again came around to his point of view and that he could not learn “the legalese”:
“There was French legal expert named Promajo who was a foreign law adviser. He made many explanations to me. We mention the capitulation article, he says, “write”, the capitulation article: “for the purpose of amendment and abolishment of the capitulations preparing the legal grounds…” Like this, like that…
“There is no preparing the legal grounds for abolishing! It is abolished! Why cannot you say like this?”
“This is legalese, it could not be the way you say it…This is legalese…” In brief, I could not learn legalese in nine months. And then, one day, Promajo came to me to word the capitulation article:
“How do you wish it to be?” he asked.
“Write!” I said, “The capitulations are abolished! Repealed!” There needed nothing to add more…”It’s done, such issue does not exist!” I said.
“Alright, we shall write it that way.” He said.
“What happened? Is this compatible with the legalese?” I asked.
“They have decided.” He said. “They have decided to abolish the capitulations…”
İnönü resigned from the West Front Commandership when he was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He bid farewell to the army with a declaration he issued on October 28 saying, “The West Front armies are the great achievement of our nation.” He stated in his speech as the Chief delegate in the GNAT on November 3 that he would be protecting the principles set by the GNAT government through the treaties contracted within the frame of the National Oath. “…We will defend our rights pursuant to the treaties accepted as the base to our policy by the National Oath and our high commission…”
In Lausanne, even the delegates who met İsmet Pasha had to agree upon his success and proficiency in the field of diplomacy. As a matter of fact, General Pellé who confronted İsmet Pasha in the second session of the conference quite often talked about him as follows:
“He was a great diplomat as he was a great soldier. He does not speak much but short. When he says “no” to something, then you know it is for sure “no”. He would do everything to prevent that from being accomplished. That was why I felt relieved when he said, “Alright, I accept it”. When he said “no”, we would know that the big challenge was ahead of us.”
Expressing that Ismet Pasha was in control of the conference in all respects, the Italian delegate said:
“He always conducted the negotiations well. He figured out the weaknesses of the others. He fought with knowledge, understanding and intelligence without giving up. After great achievements in the field of soldiery, İsmet Pasha won an unprecedented political victory in the Turkish history.”
It is of great importance that these compliments were coming from the opponents of İsmet Pasha in Lausanne.
Journey to Lausanne
After the Armistice of Mudanya, significant changes occurred in Europe concerning world politics. After five days following the signing of the armistice, that is, on October 19, Lloyd George fell from power. Bonar Law replaced him. Lord Curzon was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time. As General Harrington had perceived and guessed in Mudanya, İsmet Pasha was to meet Lord Curzon in Lausanne. England, Italia, Greece, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) and Japan governments were the participants in the Lausanne Conference. The principle, that the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria as the Black Sea countries to attend, was accepted. United States participated in the conference as the “observer”. Japan had become one of the imperial powers, which were called “the great states”. In that manner, he could not be deaf to a big conference about Turkey.
United Nations not having gone to war against Turkey and not signed the 1918 armistice did not want to take responsibility in this treaty. It was only the United States who had finally decided to attend the conference, because it had self-interest and was one of the countries to take advantage of the capitulations in Turkey. All these meant one thing: None of the states in question considered a new Turkey was being established but they thought that they were about to tear the Ottoman apart, which had transformed into a little bird. That was why the English journalist G. Ellison was surprised to see Japanese flag waving in the Lausanne Palace and could not help asking İnönü “What is Japan doing here?”
Depart for Lausanne and Commencement of the Conference
The Turkish delegation, which was comprised of the second delegate Rıza Nur and advisers chaired by İsmet İnönü left Ankara to go to Lausanne on November 4. The start of the conference was decided to be on November 13. However, when the Turkish delegate arrived at Lausanne, there was no one. Taking advantage of this delay, İnönü, accepting the personal invitation, went to Paris. He spoke to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Poincaré. In addition, in the telegram he sent to the Allied Powers’ representatives, he explained that postponing the conference would also postpone the peace. The conference with a week delay began on November 22, 1922 at 16.00 with the speech of the President of the Switzerland Confederation Mr. Haab in the Casino de Mont Benon. Haab, noting that the conference is a peace initiative that would bring an end to the Near East divergence and continued: “I hope that the Turkish-Greco war which have been ongoing for the last decade devastating Europe and part of the Asia and which has the effects that would persist throughout the next generations of both the winner and the loser will be the last act of this tragedy…”
After Haab’s speech, Lord Curzon went up to the rostrum and İsmet Pasha who believed and insisted in the principle of equality, did as well go up to the rostrum. İsmet Pasha talked about the situation as he wrote in the preamble of the Lausanne Peace Conference Proceeding Documents as follows:
“When Lord Curzon sat down, those in the conference were surprised to see me in the rostrum. After addressing the Prime Minister, I started my speech. I said that we had come with the intention of peace, but we were being treated unfairly. I concluded my speech saying that I hoped all the peace demands would prevail in the conference and we would make peace that would be fair to everyone. I then sat down.
Everyone, looking puzzled, thought that I was a soldier who was not aware of the diplomatic manner and so along with some discussions and dispute about the formality, they tolerated my interference and let it go.”
“The speech of İsmet Pasha was very eloquent. Pasha said that even at that moment there were over one million innocent Turks wandering in the uplands of the Asia Minor homeless and breadless and that we wanted freedom and independence just like all the civilized nations.” Even though this interference seemed against the rules of diplomacy, with this behavior İsmet Pasha wanted to show that we were attending the conference with the equal rights. Because he said, “if Curzon talks, I talk as well” and he underlined the fact that if the British diplomat does not talk nor does he. His reaction was just and pertinent for Lord Curzon went up to the rostrum even though he was informed that it was not his turn to talk.
Directives presented to the Turkish delegation
The GNAT government had given a directive comprised of 14 articles to the Turkish delegation going to Lausanne under the leadership of İsmet Pasha. They would negotiate in accordance with the principles provided in these 14 articles and if need be, instructions would be requested. A very important part of these articles belonged to the territorial issues. The most striking article was not accepting the “Armenian nation” in any circumstances. Bringing such topic forward meant the cessation in the negotiations. The Iraq border was going to be drawn in the way it would include Süleymaniye, Kirkuk and Mosul shires while they were going to try to settle the Syrian border. The islands close to our coasts would be included in our lands. The border of Thrace was going to be drawn like in 1914. For the Western Thrace, the National Pact resolution was to be applied, that is, holding a plebiscite. No foreign military force could be deployed in the straits and Gallipoli peninsula and due to this issue, if the negotiations should be ceased, then they would inform Ankara. The capitulations were unacceptable, and due to this, if the negotiations should be ceased, what is necessary would be done. Population exchange was to be executed with the minorities. The Ottoman public debts were to be allocated to the countries seceded from the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Public Debt Administration was to be abolished. No restrictions could be imposed on the army and navy, etc.
As is seen, almost half of the articles set out in the directive were about borders. The new Turkey’s borders were going to be drawn within the frame of these principles. This would mean the National Pact to be registered officially in an international conference. A demand to establish an Armenian nation in these borders meant cessation of the negotiations right away. In this regard, İsmet Pasha was authorized to cease the negotiations without consulting Ankara. Indeed, the Allied Powers sometimes tried to bring this issue into the table and even more, they started mentioning Assyrian Nation and Chaldean Nation. However, due to the determinate reaction of Turkey, this proposal vanished. Again, the capitulations as well were to be handled in this regard, so if required, the negotiations could be delayed. This issue arrived at a solution with the opposition of İsmet Pasha and of the Turkish delegation.
Discussions
The negotiations in Lausanne began on 21 November at Ouschy Hotel. The Allies established three commissions and elected the presidents among themselves. It was understood that the discussion were going to be tough. Indeed, the proposition made by İsmet Pasha to assign one of the presidents from Turkey and to appoint a Turkish adviser to the general secretary was overruled. Curzon did not feel comfortable that Turks having won a great victory were sitting at the same table enjoying equal rights. Indeed, throughout the debates, Curzon reminded of Mondros to which İsmet Pasha responded, “I did not come here from Mondros but from Mudanya.” Lausanne had two important aspects, which were explained by Lord Curzon. “The Turks did not usually participate in resolving problems that concerned themselves. Only the decisions made by the Allies were conveyed to them. This was how it was in Sevres as well. However, in Lausanne the situation was completely different… The Turkish attended the meetings having equal rights. All the articles of the treaty were discussed thoroughly.” Curzon wanted to show directly to İsmet Pasha that it was true that Turkish had won a great victory in terms of politics and prevailed against the West, but the independence would last for short terms and Turkey would still be dependent on the West in fields of economics. Curzon was trying to build up an opposition block against Turkey by drawing the Allies towards his side. He did not want to bring forward the important issues before they are concluded. Ismet Pasha was aware of this. It was because of this that he realized that the “peace was in hands of the British” and therefore he “designated the issues that could cause breakaway point and gave priority to solve them first.” But İsmet Pasha never neglected expressing our rightfulness from beginning to end. Moreover, the representatives who were used to have the Ottoman Empire do whatever they demand started hearing words like “sovereignty, independence” from İsmet Pasha. Indeed İsmet Pasha said, “Turkish nation as other nations is very jealous of everything related to its existence, independence and rights.” Curzon complained about İsmet Pasha mentioning sovereignty and independence too often. Of course, he was answered back. “It could never be expected of Turkey, an independent nation and state, to accept the offers that are unjust and anti-independence in every way.”
Lord Curzon did try to deceive İsmet Pasha. The threat about ceasing the conference related to the minority issue was responded by İsmet Pasha as follows: “If there is a threat in these words, and if Turkey wanted to be held responsible for this cessation, then this matter should not be handled as such. Because we had already agreed upon the rights of minorities before Lord Curzon brought it forward. In any way, the Turkish delegation did not raise difficulties. So, despite this, if the minority problem wanted to be still used as a pretext, then when the truth is revealed, it would not only be the voice of Ankara who will be in favour of us, as Lord Curzon had guessed.”
Ismet Pasha with his conscious clear said to Lord Curzon who said that their hands were clean and so they do not refrain from the audit of the League of Nations:” The hands of the Turks who have been working in their own destructed country due to the invasion of the foreign forces are especially clean. These hands never attacked another country, never invaded a country or destroyed it. Therefore, they do not have anything to be afraid of being compared with the other hands.”
Ali Naci Karacan who had witnessed this scene explained the effect of these words as follows: To the statement “We do not refrain from the audit of the League of Nations because our hands are clean”, the answer of İsmet Pasha “our hands are especially clean” had a profound effect. Even this statement alone was an enough answer to the whole speech of Lord Curzon…This incisive and just response of İsmet Pasha to Lord Curzon made the Turkish head delegate the most attractive and respectable person among the other diplomats in Lausanne. Even the foreign reporters who were the most inimical to the Turks did not have anything to say against him.
Among the main debate issues were the territory, capitulations, the minority rights and the debts of the Ottoman. The territorial issues were mostly solved with the wars. With Ankara agreement, the Syrian border was drawn and the Thrace entered into the domination of Turkey in accordance with the Armistice of Mudanya. And yet, the evacuation of İstanbul and the straits were worrisome. The Italian authority was recognized over Rhodes and Dodecanese Islands, Mosul problem was not yet resolved. It was agreed upon establishing a commission related to the straits. Furthermore, except for the Western Thrace and Istanbul, a population exchange was accepted. Abolishing capitulations was among the most challenging issues of Lausanne. All the Allied Powers and United States took a stand against us in this issue. The Allies as well accepted the fact that the capitulations being a medieval institution were actually outdated, but did not want to surrender these privileges and were looking for another solution that would replace these privileges. That was why the capitulation problem could not be resolved at the first stage of the conference although at the second stage, it was concluded in the way Turkey wanted, that is, abolished.
Another important issue was the public and debts of the Ottoman. The Ottoman Empire did not become indebted to the countries but to the people who were called bankers. These big capitalist owners were dominant over England and France. Moreover, these were the countries, which pressured to pay the debts. They wanted the debts to be paid by gold and objected to abolishing their zone of influence. Due to these privileged firms’ pressure, the conference was interrupted.
There was no doubt that Turkey was being entrapped about the minority issue. Because it was seen that the Allies perceived the definition and notion of minority differently. They divided the minorities into 3 groups of race, religion and language. This was very “desperate” situation for Turkey. Turkey could not and did not accept this. Only the religious minority term was agreed upon…
The Ottoman Empire’s debts and capitulation issues did not reach a settlement. On January 31 1923, to İsmet Pasha, the Allies submitted a letter of agreement that they arranged. About this draft, he said, “When we say we want peace, it should be understood by everyone that we mean full independence. We have every right to demand it as well as puissance.”
İsmet Pasha responded as follows to the threatening words of Lord Curzon: “I cannot sign a document that puts my nation in danger.”
Right after the cessation of the conference, French and Italian delegates took an action to remedy the situation. While on the way to Bucharest from Lausanne, İsmet Pasha gave a statement to the Universal journal and in that statement he said that the Conference had not finished but suspended. In addition, Curzon was restating that the Turks had made a big mistake not signing the peace treaty. In the Gazette de Lausanne dated 5 February 1923, it was written that the Conference was interrupted and the negotiations were not brought to fruition. This was found very regrettable.
This interruption created anxiety across Turkey. Would peace be achieved or not? Would the war start all over again? Would the conference congregate again?
The assembly meetings about Lausanne started on February 21 and for two weeks, polemics were generated. İsmet Pasha and the advisers were giving necessary explanations to the Council of State and the Eastern Thrace border along with Mosul problem, as well as financial, judicial and economic problems were being criticized. The statements given by İsmet Pasha were not found adequate and he was receiving strong criticisms. The sharpest criticisms were coming from Hüseyin Anvi (Ulaş) who had accepted to be in opposition as his unchangeable policy. Mustafa Kemal Pasha had to interfere and said “Friends, the matter at stake is indeed worrisome and critical. Discussing it with anger is inappropriate; therefore, I will take the liberty to invite all my friends to keep calm.” and gave a long speech. (27 February 1923). The negotiations continued in a negative atmosphere. In the meeting held on March 6, the resolution submitted by the deputy of Saruhan Reşat Bey and his friends was accepted and the discussions finally ended.
The second session of the Lausanne Conference began on 23 April 1923. In this session, Sir Horace replaced Curzon. The French High Commissioner General Pellé in İstanbul represented France and Venizelos represented Greece. Venizelos was trying to act like the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Vienna Conference in 1815. Italians considered the issue of adding Kastellorizo Island into the Dodecanese islands as a matter of honor. Venizelos offered to leave the triangular shaped land among Karaağaç, Maritza and Arda rivers to Turkey in lieu of war indemnity. Italians and French insisted on demanding indemnity, but renounced it in the end. The most problematic debate being capitulations were completely abolished. The distribution of the Ottoman Public Debt was accepted. The article in question is as follows (Article 28):
“Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey in every respect…”
In the Lausanne Treaty, because the restrictions such as the cabotage rights, which were to reserve for two more years, foreign legal advisers who were to be appointed in a given time, and the existence of the commission related to the straits were temporary, these had to be accepted. The Lausanne Peace Treaty consists of 143 articles and there are 17 protocols and agreements related to the treaty.
All the problematic issues that were pending were concluded on July 17 and there lied no obstacles ahead for signing the treaty. However, the authority that İsmet Pasha demanded from the government in order to sign the treaty was not given. ın this context, the Prime Minister Rauf Bey was not answering the telegram. At last, İsmet Pasha sent a long telegram on July 18 to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and asked if there was any “hesitation”. Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained that there was “no hesitation whatsoever”, and congratulated İsmet Pasha for his success.
On July 24, the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed with a big ceremony at Rumini hotel. After months of works, conflicts and debates, it was announced to the world that the peace had been finally achieved.
Atatürk said the following about this treaty:
“This treaty is a document declaring the fall of a conspiracy prepared over centuries, and thought to have been accomplished through the Sevres Treaty to crush the Turkish nation. It is a diplomatic victory unheard of in the Ottoman history!”
The Lausanne Peace Treaty was the last of all the treaties that ended the world war in terms of international law. From the point of Turkey, it was a peace treaty, which was signed at the end of the Independence War demolishing Ottoman Empire and founding new Turkey. Considering the importance of the treaties signed after the war by the winners and losers, the significance of the Lausanne would be understood much better. M. Cemil (Bilsel) who attended the Lausanne Conference and who did a comprehensive research on the 10th anniversary of signing the treaty passed the judgment on the Lausanne Treaty after comparing with the other treaties: “Scientists, they owe debt to science and history to search and tell the truth. I am not saying this to be appreciated in the eyes of others, I am saying this before the history and truth because of what I read and saw: İsmet Pasha had served the country well.
As the whole independence struggle including Lausanne is the achievement of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, Lausanne in the midst of Europe is a literal monument erected in the name of İsmet İnönü thanks to his mediation, proceedings and pursuance.”
Stating that the Lausanne was an “exam”, İnönü emphasized the importance of this experience in his memoirs as follows:
“After the Armistice of Mudanya, the Lausanne Conference was a big exam to which our nation had been invited in the middle of Europe. Is Turkey able to explain and defend its struggle clearly and decisively in the middle of the civilized realm? Is it possible that this picture is an accidental consequence of this or that coincidence in the Anatolian mountains, or of the mistake made by the enemy countries? Or is it a conscious struggle aimed at a certain target? It was the answers of these questions to which we had given the responses in the Lausanne experience.”
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